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"STANDARD" AND "ALTERNATIVE"
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE
CHANGING ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCIES
GEORGE B. WYETH*
INTRODUCTION
For the past ten years or more, environmental protection agencies have
been undergoing an extended and fundamental strategic reassessment.1 While
the core mission-protecting human health and the natural environment-
remains undisputed,2 there is increasing debate over the means by which to ad-
* Director, Policy and Program Change Division, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office
of Policy, Economics and Innovation. This Article reflects the views of the author alone and does
not represent the position of the U.S. EPA.
1 At the federal level, these efforts first became visible as part of the Clinton-era "re-
invention" efforts. See David W. Case, The EPA's Environmental Stewardship Initiative:
Attempting to Revitalize a Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50 EMORY L. J. 1
(2001) (giving an overview of developments in the Clinton era) [hereinafter Case, The
EPA's Environmental Stewardship Initiative]. The subsequent Bush Administration con-
tinued to endorse a search for innovative strategies. In 2002, under Administrator
Christine Todd Whitman, the EPA issued a report entitled "Innovating for Better Results:
A Strategy to Guide the Next Generation of Innovation at EPA." See U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, DOC. No. 100-R-02-002, INNOVATING FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL RESULTS (2002)
[hereinafter INNOVATING FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL RESULTS], available at httpj/www
.epa.gov/innovation/pdf/strategy.pdf. Michael Leavitt, the second EPA Administrator in
the Bush Administration, used the term "better way" to describe his goal of achieving
environmental objectives in a more collaborative, less costly and more locally tailored
fashion. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ADMINISTRATOR'S 500-DAY PLAN (2003)
[hereinafter ADMINISTRATOR'S 500-DAY PLAN], available at http://www.epa.gov/adminweb/
administrator/500day.pdf. In 2006, the "Action Plan" ofyet another administrator, Stephen
Johnson, identified "Innovation and Collaboration" among his core "Principles to
Accelerate the Pace of Environmental Protection." See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE
ADMINISTRATOR'S ACTION PLAN (2006) [hereinafter THE ADMINISTRATOR'S ACTION PLAN],
available at http://www.epa.gov/adminweb/administrator/actionplan .pdf. At the state
level, parallel initiatives sprang up without federal urging in such disparate locales as
Wisconsin, Oregon, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Texas. See Jerry Spier, EMSs and
Tiered Regulation: Getting the Deal Right, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? 198, 206-11 (Cary
Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001). In some cases, these programs also survived
changes in administration; in others, they did not. See infra Part IV.
2 See Environmental Protection Agency, About EPA, http://www.epa.gov/epahome/
aboutepa.htm (last visited Dec. 1. 2006).
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vance that goal.3 On one side of this debate are those who believe that
an exclusive emphasis on regulation forgoes environmental benefits that
can be achieved through more collaborative approaches;4 on the other are
those who believe that an arms-length relationship among conflicting
interests based on well-defined legal principles best furthers both public
and private goals.5
This strategic choice has profound implications for environmental
law. Our system of environmental protection has been, for the most part,
a legally-driven one.' The alternative being proposed, however, is one in
which the role of law is not exclusive or even necessarily predominant.7
' This debate has generated an extensive literature. See, e.g., THE ASPEN INST., THE
ALTERNATIVE PATH: A CLEANER, CHEAPER WAY TO PROTECT AND ENHANCE THE
ENVIRONMENT (1996) [hereinafter THE ALTERNATIVE PATH]; ENTER. FOR THE ENvT, THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SYSTEM IN TRANSITION: TOWARD A MORE DESIRABLE FUTURE
(1998) [hereinafter THE E4E REPORT]; THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
SUSTAINABLE AMERICA: A NEW CONSENSUS FOR PROSPERITY, OPPORTUNITY AND HEALTHY
ENVIRONMENT FOR THE FUTURE (1999), available at http://clinton2.nara.gov/PCSD/
Publications/tsa.pdf; THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY(Daniel C. Esty & Marian R. Chertow eds., 1997). See generally Case, The EPA's
Environmental Stewardship Initiative, supra note 1; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental
Lawyering in the Age of Collaboration, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 555 (2002); The National
Symposium on Second Generation Environmental Policy and the Law, 29 CAP. U. L. REV.
1 (2001); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey
from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 163 (1998) [hereinafter
Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation]; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Foreword,
The Search for Regulatory Alternatives, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. viii (1996).
4 See, e.g., THE ALTERNATIVE PATH, supra note 3, at 25-26 (arguing for a flexible,
stewardship-based approach to environmental protection); THE E4E REPORT, supra note
3, at 4 (arguing for an environmental protection system that offers "flexibility of means");
John Gordon & Jane Coppock, Ecosystem Management and Economic Development, in
THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note
3, at 37, 37-38 (arguing for a "collaborative approach" to settling environmental pro-
tection and economic development conflicts); Thompson, supra note 3, at viii-ix (arguing
that the inflexibility of"command-and-control" environmental regulation has been in-
effective, "inefficient ... [and] costly").
' See, e.g., Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation, supra note 3, at 201-02
(arguing that EPA's move away from "command and control" regulation to "industry self-
regulation" is dangerous for the environment, EPA and the public).
'See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 3, at 555-58.
7 See ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED 2-3 (Robert F. Durant, Daniel J.
Fiorino & Rosemary O'Leary eds., 2004) (contrasting "rule-based" and "results-based"
approaches to environmental protection); NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., RESOLVING THE
PARADOX OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION xi (1997) [hereinafter RESOLVING THE PARADOX];
THE E4E REPORT, supra note 3, at 57-60 (advocating a more "values-driven" approach).
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The emphasis is not on achieving legally-defined standards, but in con-
tinually improving environmental outcomes.8 Moreover, improvement is
driven not only by regulations but also by leadership from business,
communities, consumers and investors.9 In this model, legal authorities
are tools for improving environmental performance, but these authori-
ties do not fully define the desired outcomes.' Regulations are action-
forcing devices, baselines from which negotiation and even partnership
may proceed." In a Copernican shift of perspective, law loses its central
position and the government becomes only one of many players in a more
complex system of environmental protection. Business in particular be-
comes a driving force for change, not simply a passive participant reluc-
tantly complying with legal directives.' 2
To what extent have we moved toward an "alternative" model of
environmental protection? From the public statements of top agency
officials, one might conclude that it is gaining wide acceptance. 3 Further-
more, it can be argued that agencies risk forfeiting their positions of leader-
ship if they fail to recognize the full range of potential new strategies.
However, core regulatory programs still dominate agency business, and
even limited steps away from a legally-focused strategy have repeatedly
proven controversial. 14 Attempts to integrate non-traditional approaches
into traditional programs have had mixed success and skepticism about
the efficacy of those approaches remains. 5
'See generally THE E4E REPORT, supra note 3; RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7,
at xi ("EPA and the states must adopt new policies, systems, and techniques that focus
on environmental performance and results, rather than prescribe end-of-pipe controls.").
9 THE E4E REPORT, supra note 3, at 49-60. NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., ENVIRONMENT
.GOV: TRANSFORMING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 20 (2000)
[hereinafter ENVIRONMENT.GOV], available at http://www.p2pays.org/ref/18/17718.pdf;
Kurt Strasser, Cleaner Technology, Pollution Prevention, and Environmental Regulation,
9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 1, 3 (1997).
T171E E4E REPORT, supra note 3, at 49-60.
"Id. at 25.
12Id.
" See, e.g., The Administrator's Action Plan, supra note 1 (identifying "[i]nnovation and
[clollaboration" as a key principles under Administrator Johnson); Christine Todd
Whitman, A Message from the Administrator, in INNOVATING FOR BETTER ENVIRON-
MENTAL RESULTS, supra note 1; Kathleen A. McGinty, EnvironmentalArmistice, BLUEPRINT
MAG., Mar. 23,2004, http'//www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?contentid=252477&kaid=116&subid
=151 (discussing Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection's
endorsement of collaborative approaches).
14 See infra Part II.B.
" See, e.g., Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation, supra note 3.
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The debate over the proper role of government agencies mirrors
precisely the central question in this Symposium:i 6 whether corporations
should adopt environmentally beneficial strategies beyond those required
by law. Presumably, the same answer should be given in both arenas: if
legal requirements are the chief mechanism through which we advance
environmental protection, corporate obligations should focus on those
requirements; if law is only one of multiple reference points, the corpo-
ration's role is also more complex.
This Article analyzes the reasons that agencies have explored
"alternative" strategies, assesses the extent to which such strategies are
being adopted, and analyzes why greater change has not occurred. Part
I begins by identifying the limitations of the "standard model." 7 Part II
surveys the efforts that agencies have made to explore alternative strat-
egies, examining some examples in depth.'" Part III identifies the leading
alternative strategies that practitioners have developed and implemented. 9
Part IV provides some case studies of the implementation of alternative
model strategies. Finally, Part V assesses the degree of change to date
and offers some predictions about the likely future evolution of environ-
mental policy.2"
I. THE STANDARD MODEL AND ITS LIMITATIONS
The competing models of environmental regulation discussed in
this Article both have long pedigrees. While the legally-focused approach
has historically been predominant, there have been proponents of a more
collaborative, flexible and performance-oriented approach for many years.2'
By the same token, it is misleading to label the former as the "tradi-
16 This Article was prepared for and presented at the Symposium on "Corporate Governance
and Environmental Best Practices," organized by the William & Mary Environmental
Law and Policy Review, The College of William & Mary School of Law, Williamsburg,
Virginia, on February 4, 2006. See Symposium, Corporate Governance and Environmental
Best Practices, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 1 (2006).
" See infra Part I.
18 See infra Part II.
'9 See infra Part III.
20 See infra Part IV.
21 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:
The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 173-78 (1988);
Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual
Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1273-77 (1981) [hereinafter Stewart, Regulation,
Innovation, and Administrative Law].
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tional" or "old" view, since this prejudges the debate. Instead, these will
be referred to as the "standard" and "alternative" models.22
A. The Standard Model
The standard model is the one most familiar to the general reader.
It views business goals and environmental goals as conflicting, with the
government called upon to arbitrate between competing social interests
(e.g., economic costs and environmental benefits) by setting out legal re-
quirements that reflect its judgment about the most appropriate balance.23
Legal standards are set through legislative and administrative processes;24
businesses and other non-governmental parties can participate in these
processes, but once the rules are set, the government's job is to enforce
them and the job of business is to comply.25
In this model, relations between government and business are pri-
marily adversarial. Market forces drive business to ignore external costs;
indeed, failing to exploit a resource whose cost could be externalized could
be fatal to the corporation.26 Government intervenes, therefore, to correct
the imbalance. To the extent that businesses may have an interest in
taking steps that also happen to benefit the environment (e.g., installing
more energy-efficient equipment), this is simply part of the "baseline"
pattern of behavior that the government takes as its starting point.
Thus, in the standard model the relationship between government
and business is an arms-length one based on well-defined legal standards.
2 For the same reason, I avoid using the term "second generation" environmental pro-
tection to describe the alternative model, although it has enjoyed some popularity among
commentators. See, e.g., The National Symposium on Second .Generation Environmental
Policy and the Law, supra note 3.
2 See, e.g., Daniel J. Fiorino, Flexibility, in ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED,
supra note 7, at 393,397-98 [hereinafter Fiorino, Flexibility] (analyzing the legalistic model
and describing underlying assumptions); Case, The EPA's Environmental Stewardship
Initiative, supra note 1, at 9-10 (analyzing the standard model and contrary views).
Administrative law generally divides agency action between rulemaking and adjudi-
cation. See generally Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, andAdministrative Law, supra note
21, at 1273-77. In the environmental field, adjudication plays a relatively small role in
contrast to arenas in which agencies do a great deal of case-by-case enforcement of general
statutory principles. Id. E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Markets and Beyond: Three
Modest Proposals for the Future of Environmental Law, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 245,247 (2001).25 See generally Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law, supra note 21,
at 1274-75 (discussing the establishment and history of "notice-and-comment" rulemaking
procedures).
2 See Fiorino, Flexibility, supra note 23, at 398.
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Business is not expected to try to come up with new and better ways of
protecting the environment, and government is not expected to negotiate
away its standards once they have been put in place. Environmental agen-
cies are not concerned with matters of corporate behavior or management;
they limit their concerns to setting and enforcing regulatory requirements.
B. Limitations of a Law-Centric Approach
For almost as long as the standard model has been in place, there
have been critics who contend that it can be improved to achieve better
environmental results at lower cost.27 There are a variety of reasons for
this belief, but some recurring themes are (1) inherent limitations in regu-
lation as a tool for stimulating continued improvement,2" (2) the superior
technical capacity of businesses to develop environmental solutions (if
properly motivated to do so),29 and (3) the transaction costs associated
with an adversarial approach.30
1. Regulation's Limitations
Critiques of environmental regulation abound,3" and it will not be
possible to do them full justice here. The most longstanding arguments
focus on the efficiency (or lack thereof) of so-called "command-and-control"
regulation. Standard-model analysis tends to focus especially on the
27 Several scholars have summarized these critiques. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Reflexive
Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1227, 1235-41 (1995); Robert W. Hahn & Robert
N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?,
18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 5-6 (1991).2
1 See infra Part I.B.1.
29 See infra Part I.B.2.
30 See infra Part I.B.3. Both standard and alternative critiques can be seen as implicitly
comparing the outcomes under regulation with those that would occur if environmental
harms were fully internalized and firms responded as they do in any other market. On
one hand, corporations would only take those actions to reduce environmental harm in
which the benefits exceeded the cost. At the same time, they would continuously seek to
find new ways of reducing the (internalized) cost of the remaining harms, creating
persistent pressure to develop new technologies, change products, or take other actions
that would improve the environment. As a result, environmental performance would
steadily improve.
31 See generally supra note 27.
32 The term "command and control" has been an enormously effective rhetorical device
to disparage all forms of regulation, even though not all regulation prescribes particular
behaviors that must be adopted. See Orts, supra note 27, at 1235-41.
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tradeoff between environmental and economic values, which are assumed
to be largely in conflict." Thus, there is an immense literature debating
whether environmental regulations are unduly costly relative to the bene-
fits they achieve.34
Alternative-model thinking tends to focus more heavily on another
form of inefficiency: whether regulations overlook opportunities to achieve
benefits that could be attained at a reasonable cost. There are a variety
of reasons to believe that this could be the case. First, it is widely asserted
that regulations make it more costly than necessary to achieve desired
environmental goals, because regulations are unduly prescriptive about
the means by which to comply." While this argument is often used by
standard-model critics of regulation, alternative-model proponents focus
on the potential for redesigning regulations to reduce cost and improve
performance at the same time.
A short digression on the role of cost in alternative-model thinking
may be warranted here. Redesigning regulation to be less expensive is
often seen as a concession to industry; in fact, under the standard model,
cost and protection are generally assumed to be directly related, so that
efforts to find cheaper options are typically perceived as sacrificing en-
vironmental goals. This aspect of the alternative model tends to attract
claims that it is a cover for backsliding on environmental protection. How-
ever, advocates of flexibility see cost savings as potentially leading to
improved environmental performance in the long run. Just as developing
a cheaper way of producing any other good will likely make it more widely
used, they believe reducing the marginal cost of environmental protec-
tion should eventually allow more ambitious targets to be set.36 One of
'3 Id. at 1236.
3 4 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1995); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE COST-BENEFIT STATE (2002); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic
Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998); Conference, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal,
Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 837 (2000).
" See, e.g., RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at xi-2; Richard B. Stewart, A New
Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 30-31 (2001) [herein-
after Stewart, A New Generation]; William F. Pedersen, Contracting with the Regulated
for Better Regulations, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1067, 1069-70 (2001) (discussing how environ-
mental laws conflate ends with the means for achieving those ends).
36 To put the analysis in microeconomic terms, the "alternative model" seeks to lower the cost
curve for environmental protection, which will tend to both reduce the marginal price and
increase the total "production." A concrete example is the acid rain program established by
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104
Stat. 2399 (1990)(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (2006)). By agreeing to a trading approach,
2006]
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the most important questions to ask as we actually test alternative-model
strategies is whether this proves to be true, or whether "performance-based"
rules simply reduce the cost of achieving the same environmental goals.37
A second limitation on regulation is that it emphasizes uniformity
and does not encourage or reward performance beyond what is mandated.3"
Standards are set for large categories of regulated entities, but due to
variations among firms it is likely that some could achieve greater envi-
ronmental benefits at reasonable costs.39 Once the standard is in place,
it creates no pressure to achieve beyond that regulated standard. Further-
more, a static, uniform standard creates no incentive to find new tech-
nologies or strategies for achieving additional benefits at reasonable cost.4"
Third, regulations do not address all potential strategies even-
handedly. They tend to emphasize technologies for treating pollution
once it has been created, and to overlook "pollution prevention" strategies
such as redesigning products or production processes.41 Although pol-
lution prevention can be highly cost-effective (it can even save money or
have other business advantages), it is difficult to mandate because it is
complex and affects fundamental decisions within regulated organi-
zations. Strategies for changing the very nature of production often grow
in an organic way out of the business strategies and culture of particular
those seeking to reduce acid rain were able to obtain more stringent limitations on emissions
of sulfur dioxide. See Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer, S02 Cap-and-Trade Program in the
United States, in CHoOSING ENvIRoNMENTAL POLICY41, 43-44 (Winston Harrington, Richard
D. Morgenstern, & Thomas Sterner eds., 2004) (describing the "grand experiment" resulting
from compromise between industry and environmentalists).
" Cost reduction is of course not a bad thing, but a one-sided improvement to the system
makes matters more complex by putting greater scrutiny on whether the environmental
results are actually being maintained.
3 See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, supra note 21, at 174; Stewart,
Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law, supra note 21, at 1273-77. In contrast,
a pollution tax would create the incentive to continually search for ways to reduce pol-
lution at costs lower than the tax.
3' The variation among firms in costs of reducing pollution is well known. See, e.g., Stewart,
A New Generation, supra note 35, at 31-32. Critics generally emphasize that this means
that any given level of reduction could be achieved at lower cost by trading among firms.
See id. The point here is slightly different: that under any given regulatory requirement
there are likely to be firms that could achieve additional reductions at relatively modest
cost, but that regulation generally creates no incentive to do more than is required.
o Fiorino, Flexibility, supra note 23, at 396-97.
41 Strasser, supra note 9, at 5-6, 26-28; Thompson, supra note 3, at viii-ix. Enforcement
practices can also discourage pollution prevention. See Strasser, supra note 9, at 84-88.
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organizations.42 Products can also be difficult to regulate for the same
reason; for example, cars and pesticides that are made by relatively few
manufacturers and sold in a national market can be centrally regulated,
but controlling the makeup and design of many other products is far too
cumbersome. a3 End-of-pipe controls, on the other hand, are easier to
impose uniformly because they fall outside the core business and pro-
duction processes," even though they generally do not create any in-
centive to reduce the generation of pollution.45
A fourth limitation is that rules may create procedural hurdles that
are barriers to environmentally desirable actions. For example, pollution
prevention can be done most effectively when it is relatively easy to change
production processes. However, such changes may trigger permitting req-
uirements that create delays and administrative burdens.4" As a result,
environmental benefits may be postponed or foregone entirely.47
Finally, regulations have limits when it comes to controlling very
small sources (which can have significant cumulative impacts) or indi-
vidual behavior. For example, small farms can be significant contributors
of pollution to both water and air." However, the cost of administration
and enforcement becomes prohibitive in these cases because of the sheer
number of sources and their potential diversity. Furthermore, it is easier
to achieve consensus on controlling large businesses than small ones,
and regulation of individual behavior is rarely popular.49
42 Strasser, supra note 9, at 52 (pollution prevention is more complicated than pollution
control because it "requires innovative thinking, as well as organizational support-
ultimately a whole change in corporate culture").
4 It is hard, for example, to centrally regulate the design of products that are not uniform
from one manufacturer to another, or that are sold in relatively small quantities.
"Dennis Hirsch, Second Generation Policy and the New Economy, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001).
41 Strasser, supra note 9, at 21-22.
"See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, Lean and Green? Environmental Policy and the Flexible
Production Economy, 79 IND. L. J. 611, 630-39 (2004) [hereinafter Hirsch, Lean and Green?].
47 See id. at 637.
'See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 263, 266 (2000).
49 See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 232 (2004) ("The U.S.
public has long displayed a reluctance for self-regulation that is only matched by its zeal
for the regulation of larger, industrial sources."). Sensitivity about regulating small busi-
nesses is reflected in the special procedures agencies are required to follow when promul-
gating rules with significant small business impacts. See Keith W. Holman, The Regulatory
Flexibility Act at 25: Is the Law Achieving Its Goal?, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1119 (2006).
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2. The Potential for Business Leadership
In addition to highlighting the limitations of regulation, alternative-
model thinking also puts greater reliance on the potential for business
to solve environmental problems.5" Properly motivated, businesses can
develop better strategies for addressing environmental problems than
the government because they know more about their own activities.5'
Not only can they find better ways of controlling pollution, but (more im-
portantly) they can take more fundamental steps such as redesigning
products or production processes to use less toxic materials, generate less
waste, or create less long-term risk.52 Thus, for those who are serious
about committing to sustainability, it is important to free the organization
to use its resources and expertise to attack its environmental problems
more creatively and effectively.53
Proponents of the alternative model criticize the regulatory ap-
proach for creating a passive "compliance" culture among business man-
agers. 4 If the role of business is defined in terms of complying with rules,
business is unlikely to take leadership in the areas where regulation falls
short. In the competition for corporate resources, expenditures to comply
with the law have a much higher chance of approval than investments
50 Fiorino, Flexibility, supra note 23, at 398-401. See generally Orts, supra note 27, at
1262 (proposing a "reflexive" model of law in which structures are created to facilitate
self-direction by non-governmental institutions); James G. Speth, Foreword to BEYOND
COMPLIANCE: A NEW INDUSTRY VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENT, at ix-x (Bruce Smart ed.,
1992); Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the
President on Project XL (Nov. 3, 1995) [hereinafter White House Press Release], available
at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/speeches/2662.html ("Project XL is built on
the simple premise that in many cases companies ... understand how best to reduce
their own pollution . . ").
51 See White House Press Release, supra note 50.
52 See generally Speth, supra note 50.
See Robert C. Paehlke, Sustainability, in ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED,
supra note 7, at 35, 35-36.
MA note on the term "beyond compliance" is warranted here. See Speth, supra note 50.
The term is commonly used in referring to the level of performance sought by alternative-
model strategies. Id. However, it is potentially misleading in that it implies that "good
performance" means compliance with all applicable regulations, plus something more.
True business leadership might, however, identify strategies that achieve superior results
but differ from what is required by law.
5 See Thompson, supra note 3, at ix. A specific example is provided in NEIL GUNNINGHAM
ET AL., SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND ENVIRONMENT 107-09 (2003)
(observing that environmental staff in firms that were "Committed Compliers" were less
integrated into company planning than those in more environmentally proactive firms).
[Vol. 31:5
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in other environmentally beneficial activities.56 This effect is greatest on
those staff who are specifically responsible for environmental manage-
ment.5" Ironically, when organizations have made visible commitments
to major improvements in their long-term environmental performance,
the impetus has usually come from senior business managers, not the
environmental staff.58 This corporate culture can be mirrored by agency
staff, who define their roles as in terms of keeping business "in line" and
have little interest in looking for environmental solutions other than those
in the regulations. In this view, the regulatory culture in agencies is one
primarily of 'harm prevention' rather than continuous improvement.59
The obvious objection to relying on business to develop better
solutions is that while it may have the expertise, it lacks the proper
motivation. If businesses were natural environmentalists (or environ-
mental costs were fully internalized), we would not need environmental
laws in the first place. Proponents of the alternative model are not utopians,
however.6 " One of the principal insights that has fueled thinking about
new regulatory approaches is an evolving view of organizational moti-
vation. First, we increasingly recognize that actions taken for business
reasons may also be good for the environment: reducing pollution saves
money because it means fewer materials purchased that do not end up
in valuable products; reducing energy or water consumption can cut costs;
and even steps as simple as replacing old production units with new ones
may reduce waste.6 Some organizations aggressively pursue these pos-
sibilities, with environmentally beneficial results.62
56 GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 55, at 20-2 1.
" See, e.g., id. at 109.5 1 Id. at 28-31.
5' This distinction is of course oversimplified; the line between "preventing harm" and
"creating benefit" is somewhat artificial. For example, an agency staff member developing
a new and more stringent rule is of course aiming to improve performance. However, a
regulatory model does not tend to reward those who develop new solutions not required
by the rules; as a result within agencies there is a great deal of tension between the staff
of enforcement programs and those in technical assistance programs. I am not aware of
any studies systematically examining attitudes among agency staff; this would seem to
be a fruitful area for future research.6 0 ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED, supra note 7, at 3 ("The 'third way' that
these actors envision is grounded firmly in the realpolitik of environmental governance,
not in gauzy notions of actors suddenly eschewing self-interest for the public good.").
61 See Ken Geiser, Pollution Prevention, in ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED,
supra note 7, at 427, 430-31.
62 See ROSS & ASSOCIATES ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTING, EPA DOc. No. 100-R-03-005,
LEAN MANUFACTURING AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RESEARCH ON ADVANCED MANUFACTURING
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Furthermore, regulated organizations have increasingly adopted
proactive rather than reactive environmental strategies, ranging from
systematic self-auditing to adoption of comprehensive environmental
management systems. They are not necessarily being altruistic; they
are likely driven in part by factors such as fear of regulation (either cur-
rent or anticipated future regulation), fear of tort liability, bad publicity,
or community pressure." However, these organizations choose to address
such risks by identifying their environmental issues and attacking them
aggressively rather than by avoidance or passive compliance.6" Such firms
design their own strategies for environmental control,66 and are likely to
develop expertise in finding business-environment synergies.67 Often, in
fact, it is difficult to say whether a particular action by such organizations
is primarily motivated by environmental or business concerns.68
In some cases (probably a small share of the business universe),
firms have gone even farther and made significant environmental com-
mitments, going well beyond what is required by law. For example, a
growing number of major firms have committed to significant reductions
in greenhouse gases.6 Again, the underlying motive may be fear of future
SYSTEMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEVERAGING BE'IER ENvIRON-
MENTAL PERFORMANCE 14-20 (2003), available at httpJ/www.epa.gov/lean/leanreport.pdf.
63 See Geiser, supra note 61, at 430-31.
See id. at 431.
"See id. at 430-3 1.
6 One recent study has shown that significant differences in environmental performance
exist among firms in the pulp and paper industry that cannot be fully explained by
economics, regulatory requirements, or even community pressures. See GUNNINGHAM ET
AL., supra note 55, at 93-134. They conclude that "management style" seems to make a
significant difference. Id. at 132-34.
67 It has been observed that organizations with innovative business cultures tend to take
on environmental issues in the same way. Richard Florida & Derek Davison, Why Do
Firms Adopt Advanced Environmental Practices, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE, supra
note 1, at 82, 88.
See id. at 86-87.
69 See Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Leaders, http://www.epa.gov/climate
leaders/partners/ghggoals.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (detailing greenhouse gas
emission reduction commitments of participants in EPA's "Climate Leaders" program).
DuPont has set an overall goal of zero emissions of all kinds. See DuPont, Sustainable
Growth Progress Report, http://www2.dupont.com/SocialCommitment/enUS/SHE/usa/
us2.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). Dow has committed to reduce its energy use intensity
(i.e. relative to production) by twenty-five percent from 2005 to 2015. Dow Chemical
Company, Energy Efficiency and Conservation, http://www.dow.com/commitments/goals/
energy.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). Alcoa has set a variety of sustainability goals. See
Alcoa, Inc., Sustainability and Alcoa, http://www.alcoa.com/global/en/aboutalcoa/
sustainability/2020_Framework.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
"STANDARD" AND "ALTERNATIVE" PROTECTION
regulation or of bad publicity from environmental groups, which may help
explain why it is often large and highly-visible companies that make such
commitments. However, such behavior suggests at least a broader and
more forward-looking sense of 'self-interest' than the standard model
typically assumes.7 ° Even if the standard model is correct in assuming
that business and environmental goals conflict, the line between what a
corporation does in its own self-interest, and what it does in the public
interest, becomes increasingly blurry. Furthermore, it is clear that firms
behave differently in the extent to which they adopt a broad view of self-
interest, a difference that may have implications for public policy.7
When these possibilities are taken into account, a more complex
picture emerges. On one hand, regulation is undoubtedly a principal force
driving better environmental results. 2 At the same time, if some regulated
firms take the initiative to develop their own solutions to environmental
problems, it is possible that regulatory strictures designed to control pol-
lution sources may have the inadvertent effect of impeding desirable
behavior.73 They emphasize control and uniformity rather than continuous
improvement; they focus on certain types of beneficial activity more than
others; they may emphasize what to do rather than what goals to aim for;
and they may impede desirable action. Thus, an exclusive emphasis on
regulatory compliance might create a reactive, passive corporate culture
and actually stand in the way of the environmental leadership that some
firms are willing to provide.
3. Transaction Costs
A third source of frustration with the standard model, particularly
for agency leaders, is the high level of transaction costs that a legally-
based strategy often entails. Both rule-drafting and enforcement actions
eat up significant amounts of agency time and money, and can take years
to accomplish.74 Rules are particularly vulnerable to delay because of the
need to anticipate and analyze a wide range of potential impacts; the
"ossification" of environmental rulemaking has been extensively
70 See GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 55, at 21-22.
71 See generally id. at 22.
72 See id. at 1-3.
" In some cases, as will be seen later, there are direct regulatory impediments to po-
tentially desirable behavior. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. In others, as
described here, there is a more general impediment resulting from an exclusive focus on
regulatory compliance.
71 See Pedersen, supra note 35, at 1084-88.
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discussed.75 Similarly, enforcement cases are subject to all the usual costs
and delays associated with complex litigation. Agency leaders who want
to see some kind of tangible progress within their tenures would like to
find an easier alternative that spends fewer resources on process and
more on achieving the desired outcomes.
The desire to reduce transaction costs works hand in hand with the
desire to take advantage of the potential for leadership on the part of
regulated organizations. When negotiations are conducted in an adver-
sarial, arms-length posture, they are likely to focus on whether and how
soon new mandates can be put into place, and how stringent they will be.
In other words, the desired end is defined in terms of regulatory require-
ments, largely precluding creative thinking on the part of business or
other participants. Approaching negotiation more broadly (e.g., looking for
the best solution to the underlying environmental problem) and more
collaboratively may allow better use of the expertise of the parties
involved. Less adversarial strategies thus seem appealing as a way of
achieving better results more quickly. 6
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE ALTERNATiVE MODEL
All of the factors discussed above have led environmental agencies
to search for an alternative model of environmental protection in which
the roles of the participants-governments, businesses, communities, and
individuals-are markedly altered. In many respects, the core elements
of the alternative model have been in existence almost as long as the stan-
dard model itself, but efforts to put them into action have been particu-
larly vigorous over the past ten to fifteen years.
A. Key Features of the Alternative Model
The alternative model differs from the standard model in many
ways, but a few are particularly central.
1. Focus on Results
Perhaps the bedrock principle of the "alternative" model is a focus
on results rather than implementation of statutory prescriptions.7" Within
75 See, e.g., id. at 1070, 1084-85 (citing several authorities that discuss "ossification").
76 See Fiorino, Flexibility, supra note 23, at 399.
77 Robert F. Durant, Daniel J. Fiorino & Rosemary O'Leary, Introduction to ENVIRONMENTAL
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agencies, this may be the most visible transformation to date. At least
in theory, programs are responsible not simply for carrying out assigned
tasks, but for pursuing environmental goals.78 A results-focused approach
does not inherently reject traditional methods but opens the door for con-
sideration of more innovative alternatives.79 It also shifts thinking from
a focus on compliance and harm prevention to looking at the potential
for continuous improvement.8 °
It is interesting to look at how a results-driven model differs from
a legally-driven one. In legal analysis, the term "results-oriented" has nega-
tive overtones; it suggests a willingness to neglect important principles
in pursuit of the "right" outcome. In alternative-model thinking, a focus
on results is benign, putting importance not just on how many outputs
a program achieves (e.g., number of permits written or enforcement cases
brought), but on what it accomplishes in larger terms.8 ' However, it can
become a matter of concern for standard-model proponents, who see it as
masking a reduced commitment to aggressive environmental protection.82
For example, providing compliance assistance may improve the overall
performance of some industry sectors, but critics might see a slackening
in enforcement as sending the wrong message.
2. Continuous Improvement, Not Compliance, Is the Goal
Given the emphasis on environmental results, conformity to regu-
lation is less central than in the standard model. Legal requirements are
an important benchmark and reference point, but no longer define the
desired outcome. 3 Many other practices not mandated by regulation con-
GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED, supra note 7, at 1, 2-3 (discussing an approach "that focuses on
building a results-based (or outcomes-based) sense of common purpose"); RESOLVING THE
PARADOX, supra note 7, at 1 (noting "increased emphasis on performance, on achieving
measurable environmental results"); Western Governors' Association, Enlibra, httpJ/www
.westgov.org/wga/initiatives/enlibraldefault.htm (last visited Dec. 1; 2006) (identifying eight
"Enlibra Principles," one of which is to "Reward Results, Not Programs").
v8 For example, EPA's strategic plan requires agency activities to be linked to five major
goals, framed primarily in terms of environmental outcomes. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA 2006-2011 STRATEGIC PLAN: CHARTING OUR COURSE 1 (2006) (draft for
public review), available at http://www.epa.gov/cfo/plan/06draftarch.htm.79 See RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at 1.
80 See id.
81 See Durant, Fiorino & O'Leary, Introduction, supra note 77, at 23 n.3.
82 See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor, Myths of the Reinvented State, 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 223, 233,
236 (2001) [hereinafter Steinzor, Myths] (questioning the shift of focus to results).
83 See RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at 1.
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tribute to the larger goal of improved performance. 4 Furthermore, in the
alternative model goals are not static; continuous improvement, rather than
simply attainment, is the aim.85
Under this approach, attention is given not only to how an organi-
zation's performance stands relative to legal norms, but also to how it com-
pares with others and to what its direction is over time." While agencies
usually insist on compliance as a starting point, there is wide recognition
that absolute compliance may be impossible, especially for companies
subject to many complex requirements.8 7 At the same time, compliance
alone does not define good performance; a true measure of leadership may
also take into account the overall quality of environmental management
or accomplishments in non-mandated but environmentally important
pollution prevention practices.
3. Regulations May Be Negotiable
Given the reduced emphasis on law as the definition of desirable
behavior, regulations may serve not as the goal to be achieved, but as the
starting point for negotiating other superior arrangements, for example,
where an organization can achieve or exceed the regulatory goal more
cheaply.8  A less controversial variation may be to redesign rules to reflect
the varying circumstances in which they are applied. For example, rules
may be tailored to be less prescriptive for companies that have demon-
strated sustained superior performance.
84 See, e.g., id. at 5 (citing NAT'LACAD. OF PUB. ADMTN., SETTING PRIORITIES, GEnTING RESULTS
(1995)) (recommending "legislation encouraging firms to go beyond mere compliance").
85 See id. at 1.
86 Id.
" J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory
Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 767 (2003); Orts, supra note 27,
at 1240.
8 Professor Farber has described this as a form of "slippage," not in the sense of back-
sliding from established standards, but as a form of "positive slippage" to achieve better
results than would result from inefficient rules. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage
Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 305-11 (1999) [hereinafter Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously]. See
Daniel A. Farber, Triangulating the Future of Reinvention: Three Emerging Models of
Environmental Protection, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 77 (2000) [hereinafter Farber,
Triangulating the Future] ("... . it is not difficult to imagine negotiation emerging as the
dominant form ofenvironmental protection."); see also E. Donald Elliott, Toward Ecological
Law and Policy, in THTIKING ECOLOGICALLY, supra note 4, at 170, 183 (suggesting replace-
ment of "command and control" with "command and covenant").
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4. Relationships Are More Collaborative
Collaboration is a recurring theme in discussions of second-
generation environmental policy.89 Collaboration is a very broad concept
that can take many forms.9" At one end of the spectrum, it may be an
extension of familiar rights to public participation in agency decisions.9
For example, stakeholder advisory groups may be involved in the devel-
opment of regulations well in advance of formal public notice of a pro-
posed rule.92 Extra efforts may be made to publicize hearings on local
permitting or cleanup decisions, or to provide information to the public in
advance of those hearings.93 However, collaboration can extend to situ-
ations in which the environmental agency is not the sole or even primary
decision-maker, as in negotiations over complex issues affecting a broad
geographic area such as the Great Lakes.9 4 It can also take the form of
partnerships between government agencies and individual firms or indus-
tries, or negotiations aimed at developing superior, tailored local solutions
for a particular facility or community.95
5. Multiple Centers of Leadership
In the standard model, direction-giving flows from the govern-
ment to regulated organizations, whose principal role is to understand
and comply with applicable regulations. As the emphasis on collabor-
9 See Farber, Triangulating the Future, supra note 88, at 72-79; Thompson, supra note 3,
at xiii. "Collaboration" was highlighted as one of the Western Governors' Association's
"Enlibra Principles." Western Governors' Association, supra note 77.
90 See INT'L ASS'N FOR PUB. PARTICIPATION, IAP2 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION SPECTRUM, avail-
able at http://www.iap2.org/associations/4748/files/spectrum/pdf (describing a range of
ways in which agencies may involve the public, from informing to empowering).
"l Public Involvement Policy, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,946 (June 6, 2003).92 See id. at 33,948 (encouraging that public involvement be especially considered in sig-
nificant rulemaking). For more on formal regulatory negotiation processes, see Laura I.
Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation versus Conventional Rule Making:
Claims, Counterclaims and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 599
(2000); see also Daniel J. Fiorino, Regulatory Negotiation as a Policy Process, 48 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 764 (1988) [hereinafter Fiorino, Regulatory Negotiation].
See Public Involvement Policy, 68 Fed. Reg. at 33,948.
See Exec. Order No. 13,340, 3 C.F.R. 586 (2004-2005) (establishing the "Great Lakes
Interagency Task Force").
95 See id.; Timothy J. Mohin, The Alternative Compliance Model: A Bridge to the Future of
Environmental Management, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,345, at 10,352-53 (1997).
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ation suggests, the alternative model recognizes multiple centers of leader-
ship: government, business, communities, and others. s6 Environmental
agencies still play the largest single role,9" but in particilar instances
initiative may flow from others, including the regulated community. 8 As
a result, the "environmental protection system" is a web of actors pro-
ducing a joint output.
In particular, in the alternative model we may find government per-
forming functions that seem more suited for business (e.g., designing and
promoting pollution prevention techniques that also save money or have
other business advantages). At the same time, business may play a more
directive, quasi-governmental role, such as establishing industry standards
for environmental management systems, or showing leadership in develop-
ing innovative solutions to longstanding environmental problems.9
B. Critiques of the Alternative Model
Just as regulation has shortcomings, alternative-model strategies
have limitations as well. They have received serious criticism primarily, but
not exclusively, from environmental groups and their allies in academia."°
Those who were involved in establishing the current system believe that
there is little here that they have not heard before; cries for greater flex-
ibility have been made throughout the history of environmental regula-
tion.1"' Critics of alternative-model strategies are skeptical about the
likelihood that regulated organizations will be motivated to provide
environmental benefits, at least beyond the point where, at the margin,
costs exceed benefits to the firm.1 2 While these critics welcome environmen-
96 See Mohin, supra note 95, at 10,355.
97 See id. at 10,354.
98 See id. at 10,355.
' See infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text (describing business-created standards
for environmental management systems); see also supra note 69 (highlighting corporate
commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, promote sustainability, and reduce
energy use).
"oo See, e.g., DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw (2003);
Case, The EPA's Environmental Stewardship Initiative, supra note 1, at 9-11 (describing
skepticism of the alternative model); Steinzor, Myths, supra note 82, at 238; Steinzor,
Reinventing Environmental Regulation, supra note 3, at 163.
101 See Fiorino, Flexibility, supra note 23, at 399-401.
10 2 See DRIESEN, supra note 100, at 99-100 (arguing that the market creates incentive to
avoid wasting materials, but not to implement "environmental innovations" where there
is a net cost to avoiding waste). But see Farber, Triangulating the Future, supra note 88,
at 71 (summarizing this viewpoint and critiquing it).
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tal leadership, they see it as exceptional and unreliable- subject to change
when competitive pressures become too intense-and "beyond the capacity
of government to ... produce.""0 3 They also see good behavior as having
largely resulted from the pressure that regulation and community
organization have created."° There is evidence, for example, that vigorous
regulatory enforcement can encourage "beyond compliance" behavior.0 5
These critics recognize that regulated organizations may have
business reasons for taking environmentally desirable actions, but argue
that it is not necessary or appropriate to make regulatory concessions to
obtain such benefits. From this perspective, if regulatory flexibility is to
be provided, it should only be to obtain outcomes beyond what regulated
organizations would otherwise do in their own self-interest. Critics of
flexibility question the frequency of regulatory barriers to environmental
benefits, and the extent to which they actually deter desirable behavior. 16
They note that most regulatory standards do not specify how the standards
must be attained,0 7 and point out that a good deal of pollution prevention
and recycling already occurs within the regulatory system. 0 8
Critics of the alternative model are also skeptical of claims that
rules should be more "performance-based" to allow regulated organi-
zations to design their own strategies for achieving environmental goals.'09
First, they doubt that the scientific knowledge necessary to supersede
"technology-based" standards exists."0 Second, one with a less benign view
of corporate motives is likely to believe performance-based regulation will
'os See, e.g., Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation, supra note 3, at 163. Even
those who demonstrate environmental leadership in some respects may, at the same
time, resist other demands that they see as unduly costly, or that do not contribute in
any way to their core organizational goals. See, e.g., Sandra Rothenberg, Frits K Pil, &
James Maxwell, Lean, Green and the Quest for Superior Environmental Performance, 10
PRODUCTION & OPERATIONS MGMT. 228, 240 (2001). Some research indicates, for example,
that "lean manufacturing" practices lead organizations to be strong on pollution pre-
vention but reluctant to pay for pollution abatement. Id. at 230-31.
104 DRIESEN, supra note 100, at 26.
105 See Jay P. Shimshack & Michael B. Ward, Enforcement and Overcompliance (Tufts
University Working Paper, 2005), available at http://www.som.yale.edu/Faculty/nok4/
Files/seminar/shimshak.pdf.
1
06 See DRIESEN, supra note 100, at 185.
10' See id. at 191 (challenging the argument that Clean Air Act permits impede poten-
tially beneficial process changes).
108 See Strasser, supra note 9, at 43-44 (noting that waste disposal regulation led to in-
creased efforts to minimize waste generated).
109 DRIESEN, supra note 100, at 50.
"1 Steinzor, Myths, supra note 82, at 238.
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most likely encourage regulated parties to come up with cheaper (and pos-
sibly inferior) ways of meeting a goal, rather than stimulating superior
environmental strategies.11' At a minimum, they demand close scrutiny
to ensure that flexibility on means does not result in backsliding on ends,
especially if it involves trading a certain outcome for one that is less sure,
as is often the case with innovative technologies or business strategies. "2
From this perspective, offering flexibility as an incentive for superior
performance is also suspect. For those who see standards as insufficiently
stringent to begin with, the idea of offering industry-offsetting rewards
to get further gains is hard to accept. As a matter of principle, they would
consider such a trade questionable: why should we give up one aspect of
environmental protection to reduce some other environmentally harmful
behavior? Shouldn't both simply be prohibited? From this perspective,
asking for regulatory relief as a condition for committing to "beyond com-
pliance" behavior casts doubt on the sincerity of an entity's claim to be an
environmental leader. The best way to improve performance, from this
viewpoint, is to ratchet up mandates on all, arguing that this should work
to the advantage of those who have already gone beyond compliance." 3
In short, from this perspective, any stepping back from an ad-
versarial approach toward regulatory organizations is viewed with con-
cern, and the underlying motivations are viewed as highly suspect. This
includes skepticism about non-regulatory efforts to influence behavior
such as programs that enlist companies to make voluntary commitments
to environmental goals, which are seen not as benign, but as shielding
industry from regulatory enforcement." 4 While opportunities for public
participation in decision-making are viewed as important in protecting
citizen rights, critics are less comfortable with the extension to collabora-
tive strategies in which they feel citizens will be at a disadvantage in
"' David Driesen, however, supports performance-based standards, while arguing that
the criticism of existing regulation as unduly prescriptive is unfounded. DRIESEN, supra
note 100, at 49-54. An important factor is how effectively performance can be measured.
If performance is unclear, agencies can be pressured to approve strategies that are cheaper
only because they do not get the job done.
12 See Steinzor, Myths, supra note 82, at 235-36.
113 See DRIESEN, supra note 100, at 197 (arguing that stringent regulation promotes tech-
nical innovation). Particularly outside the circles of technocratic experts, flexibility is often
equated with a relaxation of standards resulting from industry "capture" of the regulatory
agency. Fiorino, Flexibility, supra note 23, at 397.
" Press Release, Eric Schaeffer, Environmental Integrity Project, EPA "Honor System"
Leads to More Pollution at 10 Out of 13 Industrial Sites Getting Less Oversight (Feb. 8,
1996), available at http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/pub360.cfm.
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terms of resources and expertise, and may be pressured to give up claims
they might otherwise assert. '15 From this perspective, it is the govern-
ment's job to be an active watchdog on behalf of citizens, not an osten-
sibly neutral "facilitator" on an inherently uneven playing field.
There is also skepticism about the alternative model within the
agencies. Although agency leaders have repeatedly endorsed strategies such
as collaboration and partnership rather than legal processes to develop
superior solutions, many agency staff remain doubtful. One barrier is that
the alternative model does not square well with the constitutional and
legal framework in which agency staff work. The legal model is top-down,
giving direction through legislation which is then carried out by agencies.
The alternative model is more often bottom-up, or at least allows for more
than one source of direction and leadership.
116
Past experience is also a factor. A long history of industry oppo-
sition to environmental initiatives has not bred confidence. Enforcement
staff, who have the greatest experience in an adversarial setting, are par-
ticularly mistrustful of strategies that rely on business to maintain high
standards with limited oversight. Similarly, regulatory staff are often
skeptical of the effectiveness of "softer" strategies such as partnership
programs which do not compel action but seek to induce it through infor-
mation, publicity and general encouragement. To date, it has proven diffi-
cult to integrate strategies: programs promoting sustainability, steward-
ship or pollution prevention remain largely separate from regulatory pro-
grams, creating two cultures between which there is much conflict.
Regulatory staff also may consider alternative strategies simply
irrelevant to their work. Most agencyjobs are defined by the tools avail-
able to them. If regulatory instruments do not lend themselves to advan-
cing goals such as sustainability or pollution prevention, regulatory staff
will not have much interest in those goals.
Although the alternative model is often criticized as unduly favor-
ing industry, some in the business world have voiced skepticism as well.
Many in the business world are wary of partnerships with government,
anticipating burdens that will outweigh any benefits to them." ' Even those
"' See David Dana, The New "Contractarian" Paradigm in Environmental Regulation,
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 51-59 (2000); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 83-85 (1997).
"' See Mohin, supra note 95, at 10,354-55; see also White House Press Release, supra note 50.
..7 See, e.g., Dennis H. Treacy, Vice President, Environmental Law and Corporate Affairs,
Smithfield Foods, Inc., Address at the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy
Review Symposium: Corporate Governance and Environmental Best Practices (Feb. 4,2006).
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who are environmental leaders may fear that government intervention
will drain the enthusiasm and internal commitment that makes environ-
mental initiatives within corporations successful." 8 Other businesses are
likely to be primarily interested in making standards less stringent or,
if that is not possible, lowering the cost of achieving existing standards.
They view programs offering regulatory flexibility for "superior environ-
mental performance" as a form of extortion, asking why they should be
expected to do something extra in order for the government to adopt more
efficient rules." 9
A related but distinct critique comes from those who, while not
necessarily favoring business interests, are doubtful in principle about
the value of government intervention in the market. From this perspec-
tive, the government should try to make its rules as efficient as possible,
and then minimize the administrative or transaction costs involved in carry-
ing them out. Some regulatory innovations, such as performance-based
standards and trading, may have appeal from this perspective, but volun-
tary programs and collaborative partnerships have the look of intrusive
"big government."
III. ALTERNATIVE-MODEL STRATEGIES
By now, the alternative model has been put into practice for long
enough that we can identify the leading strategies that are used by its
practitioners. This section provides an overview of those strategies. The
topics in this section have been discussed at great length elsewhere; accord-
ingly, this Article will provide just enough information to introduce each
topic, while providing essential references. Readers who are familiar with
the literature on "alternative model" policies may choose to skip to Part IV.20
A. Regulatory Innovation
Part of the alternative model involves innovative approaches to
regulation. This has taken a variety of forms.
118Id.
119 Mohin, supra note 95, at 10,353 (noting concern about "[gireenmail").
12A very similar listing of strategies can be found, for example, in RESOLVING THE PARADOX,
supra note 7, at 9.
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1. Performance-Based Regulation and Trading
It is often argued that regulated organizations should be allowed
to find better ways of achieving specific environmental goals, rather than
being bound by "command and control" regulation.' 2 ' Flexibility of this
kind (usually referred to as "performance-based regulation") can be pro-
vided in two ways: first, by setting broad (usually numeric) performance
goals rather than specifying particular practices; second, by creating vari-
ance procedures that allow alternative approaches to be adopted on a
case by case basis.'22
Closely related to performance-based regulation is emissions trad-
ing, which sets a total limit on emissions of a particular pollutant, assigns
entitlements and allows the market to determine where and by whom
(and to some extent when) the limit will be reached.'23 The difference be-
tween the two is that trading operates on a larger scale, setting targets at
a national or regional scale rather than within a facility.
It is common to view these strategies chiefly as a means of reduc-
ing compliance costs. The most obvious consequence of allowing a regulated
organization to choose the means of attaining a particular goal is that it
may find cheaper ways of doing so than regulations otherwise would
require. To the extent that the change is simply to a differently-framed
set of enforceable rules (redesigned to avoid being overly prescriptive),
the result is still close to the standard model, still emphasizing compli-
ance rather than continuous improvement.
However, alternative-model proponents contend that these ap-
proaches could also lead to environmental benefits. First, if a truly inno-
vative approach is developed, it is likely that the new strategy will be
both cheaper and more effective; rarely would it be possible to calibrate
so finely as to achieve exactly the same environmental result at lower
... See RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at 2.
122 To some extent, flexibility of this kind is already available through waivers that permit
regulated organizations to demonstrate alternative modes ofcompliance. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R.
§ 761.65(e) (2005) (allowing demonstration of alternative method of destroying PCBs);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (2000). CERCLA allows waiver of requirements for Superfund cleanups
based on showing that an alternative plan achieves equivalent results. Id. § 9621(d)(4).
123 An extensive literature exists on trading. See, e.g., DRIESEN, supra note 100, at 59-68;
RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at 25-27; Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based
Environmental Policies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 31 (Paul
R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2000); David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading
Encourage Innovation?, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,094 (2003).
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cost. Second, those seeking waivers may err on the side of better results
in order to overcome uncertainties that might stand in the way of obtain-
ing approval for the substitution. Third, it may change the culture of
regulated organizations in a desirable way if they are invited to think
about new ways of solving the environmental problem at hand rather
than simply to read and comply with the regulations. Finally, and most
fundamentally, over the long term, if we allow firms to find cheaper ways
to achieve environmental goals, we may be able to set goals that are more
ambitious and reach them sooner." 4
2. Removing Regulatory Barriers
Another commonly-proposed "alternative model" regulatory strategy
is removing requirements that act as inadvertent barriers to practices
that are environmentally desirable. It is rare for such practices to be pro-
hibited, but regulatory structures can be limiting for those organizations
that proactively pursue creative solutions to environmental problems (e.g.,
adopting a new technology that is more environmentally-friendly, but would
trigger a permit change that is expensive and time-consuming).'25
3. Creating Incentives
A third strategy often proposed is to offer regulatory flexibility as
an incentive for superior performance. In contrast to strategies that remove
barriers, this line of thinking focuses on stimulating desired behaviors
124 Perhaps the prime example of this effect is the trading scheme established in the 1990
Clean Air Act amendments for reducing emissions that cause acid rain; because that
approach was used, industry agreed to a more ambitious target than could otherwise
have been attained. See Burtraw & Palmer, supra note 36, at 44.
125 See E. Donald Elliott & Mohamed Tarifi, Integrating Sustainable Development Into
U.S. Law and Business, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,170, at 10,176 (2003);
Hirsch, Lean and Green?, supra note 46, at 637; Michele Ochsner, Pollution Prevention:
An Overview of Regulatory Incentives and Barriers, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 586, 592-93 (1998).
For further detail on the effect of air permits, see infra notes 271-73 and accompanying
text. Another example sometimes cited is the potential deterrent effect of hazardous waste
regulations on recycling. See Elliott & Tarifi, supra at 10,176. On one hand, hazardous
waste rules have made waste management and disposal much more costly, creating an
incentive to reduce the amount of waste generated and to find alternatives to disposal.
On the other hand, the burden associated with handling materials labeled as "hazardous
waste" has discouraged some potential recyclers from accepting material, resulting in it
being sent to a landfill. See id. Therefore, some argue for exempting recyclable materials
from the definition of hazardous waste.
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beyond those that organizations would choose to undertake for their own
internal reasons. A wide range of incentives have been proposed at one time
or another, such as:
Reducing the frequency of inspection for firms with
good compliance records; 2 '
* Expediting permit approval for top performers; 27
* Offering top performers less prescriptive or less
stringent requirements;
128
Reducing monitoring requirements for firms whose
discharges are consistently well below permit limits."2
Incentives are often described as a "trade" of regulatory relief in
exchange for some desirable action on the part of the regulated organi-
zation. However, this is not necessarily the case; for example, reducing
enforcement oversight of firms that have consistently strong compliance
records may be a rational reallocation of limited inspection resources.
4. Tailoring Regulation
Still another strategy often proposed is to "tailor" regulation to
account for differences in regulated organizations. This is not an entirely
innovative technique; regulations have always distinguished, for example,
between large and small sources. However, alternative-model strategies
take this concept further.3 ° Similarly, some have suggested that firms
with strong environmental management systems might receive different
12 For example, members of EPA's Performance Track program receive reduced inspection
priority. Enviromnental Protection Agency, Low Priority for Routine Inspections, http:l
www.epa.gov/performancetrack/benefits/routineinspect.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
127 GLOBAL ENVTL. MGMT. INITIATIVE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH BUSINESS
INCENTIVES 9 (1999), available at http://www.gemi.org/IDE-004.pdf.
12See id. at 10.
'
29 For example, Indiana's Environmental Stewardship Program offers as one incentive
the ability to submit information annually rather than monthly. Indiana Department of
Environmental Management, Environmental Stewardship Program: Incentives, http://
www.in.gov/idem/prevention/esp/incentives.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
130 One example is of this is a Project XL proposal designing alternative hazardous waste
regulations for university or hospital laboratories. See Environmental Protection Agency,
Project XL: New England Universities Laboratories, http'J/www.epa.gov/projectxl]nelabs/
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
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regulatory treatment than those who simply do the minimum necessary
to avoid being caught out of compliance.' 3'
The line between tailored regulation and incentives is sometimes
unclear. Creating less stringent regulations for good performers, for
example, is often described as an "incentive" for good behavior. However,
tailoring regulation is not a quid pro quo in which something is "given
up" by the agency to get something else in return. Instead, it is a matter
of designing regulations to fit particular circumstances, and recognizing
that circumstances may vary significantly among firms.
5. Sector-Based Regulation
Another innovative model allows industry sectors to develop their
own plans for improving performance as an alternative to having more
stringent regulations imposed upon them. Most notably tried in the
Netherlands using industry-wide "covenants,"'32 this strategy has not
been used in the United States in an enforceable form, although some
efforts have been made to establish agreed-upon targets that industry
can voluntarily seek to attain. Like performance-based regulation, sector-
based regulation focuses on broad goals while using the superior exper-
tise of the regulated industry to achieve those goals most effectively.'33
6. Multimedia Strategies
Many innovative regulatory strategies address problems on a
holistic, multimedia basis rather than focusing on air, water, or land. Multi-
media approaches are not inherently more flexible or performance-oriented;
they are associated with alternative-model thinking because the existing
legal structure is primarily defined by environmental medium.' Multi
131 See Cary Coglianese, Policies to Promote Systematic Environmental Management, in
REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE, supra note 1, at 181, 187.
132 See TERRY DAVIES ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, RFF REPORT: REFORMING
PERMITTING 52-57 (2001) (describing the Dutch "covenant" system).
"
3 A major effort in the Clinton administration, called the Common Sense Initiative ("CSI"),
examined alternative regulatory strategies for entire business sectors. Case, The EPA's
Environmental Stewardship Initiative, supra note 1, at 41-43 (describing history of CSI).
The CSI was ended in 1998, but a similar effort on a smaller scale is ongoing. Id. at 43.
See RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at 17-19; Environmental Protection Agency,
Sector Strategies Program, http://www.epa.gov/sectors (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (describ-
ing EPA's current "sector strategies" program).
"
4 See Bradford C. Mank, The Environmental Protection Agency's Project XL and Other
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media strategies tend to focus on problems and then look for the tools to
solve them (either regulatory or non-regulatory) rather than defining goals
in terms of the legal regime. 3 ' Multimedia approaches are also seen as
more likely to lead to pollution prevention, whereas a single-medium
approach tends to emphasize end-of-pipe controls.'36
Formal multimedia regulatory strategies have been infrequent in
the United States because they are difficult to implement within our
medium-based legal framework. New Jersey experimented with multi-
media permitting in the 1990s, but the program has been terminated.'37
A more successful program adopted by Massachusetts in the mid-1990s
for regulating small sources, such as drycleaners, has been endorsed by
EPA and is being adopted in a growing number of states. 3 ' However, the
most ambitious integrated regulatory systems are overseas, especially in
the European Union, which has directed its member states to move to
"integrated" permits.
39
Another kind of multimedia effort involves geographically-focused
responses to environmental problems. 4 ° These do not change the regula-
tory structure itself, but use regulatory and non-regulatory strategies that
cross media lines. For example, environmental harms to the Chesapeake
Bay come from a wide variety of sources: discharges by sewage treat-
ment plants, runoff from farms, emissions from power plants (often very
Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The Need for Legislative Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q.
1, 6-7 (1998).
115 See id. at 7-10.136 Id. at 8.
... See ENVIRONMENT.GOV, supra note 9, at 53-56 (assessing results of New Jersey's
multimedia permitting program); DAVIES ET AL., supra note 132, at 75-78. The program
was not continued, but was folded into a "leadership" program referred to as "Gold Track,"
which was itself terminated when the commissioner changed. ENVIRONMENT.GOV, supra
note 9, at 55-56; Profile, The Integrator, ENvTL. F., July-Aug. 2002, at 44, 47.
1 8 Referred to as the Environmental Results Program ("ERP"), this model has now attracted
interest from over a dozen states. See ENVIRONMENT.GOV, supra note 9, at 34-39 (describing
EPA's initially cautious response to ERP); Environmental Protection Agency, States
Implementing ERP, http'/www.epa.gov/permits/erp/states.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
EPA now supports wider use of the approach. See generally Environmental Protection
Agency, Environmental Results Program, http://www.epa.gov/permits/erp/index.htm (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006).
139 DAVIES ET AL., supra note 132, at 71-75. See EUROPA, The IPPC Directive, http://ec
.europa.eulenvironmentlippc/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
14o See generally Environmental Protection Agency, Programs With a Geographic Focus,
http://www.epa.gov/epahome/places.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (providing hyperlinks
to several geographically-focused environmental programs).
2006]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLIY REV.
far away), overfishing, and even automobile emissions.' Accordingly,
the response effort goes far beyond any single regulatory regime. Further-
more, solutions typically require a collaborative effort involving multiple
jurisdictions and multiple levels of government, as well as a variety of
businesses and other partners.
B. Non-Regulatory Strategies
Regulatory innovation is only a part of the alternative model.
Equally if not more important are quasi- or non-regulatory strategies
that aim to achieve benefits beyond what rules would require.
1. Compliance Assistance
The standard model assumes that regulated firms will seek to
avoid compliance if they can get away with it, and that government's role
in ensuring compliance is to find and punish noncompliance. 142 Most agen-
cies now believe, however, that while some firms choose not to comply,
others may be willing to comply, but fail because they do not know how.
Small businesses, for example, are likely to have a hard time keeping
track of regulatory requirements. Even large businesses claim to find com-
pliance difficult simply because of the complexity of environmental rules;
it is widely believed that any large industrial facility is likely to have vio-
lations from time to time, even if it is making a concerted effort to stay
within the rules. 143 In recognition of this, agencies have increasingly set
up compliance assistance programs, which provide information about
regulatory requirements and even onsite assistance."M
141 See Chesapeake Bay Program, Bay Pollutants, httpJ/www.chesapeakebay.net/stressorl
.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
142 See supra Part I.A.
' Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 87, at 766-67. See Orts, supra note 27, at 1240.1
"See Environmental Protection Agency, Compliance Assistance, http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/assistance/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (describing EPA compliance
assistance programs); Maryland Department of Environment, Business Information Center,
http'lwww.mde.state.md.us/BusinessInfoCenter/index.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (describ-
ing Maryland's assistance program). The ERP integrates assistance into a regulatory
"self-certification" requirement which increases the likelihood that compliance tools will
be utilized, and uses random inspections to monitor overall compliance patterns and gen-
erate information on business performance. Environmental Protection Agency, What is
ERP?, httpJ/www.epa.gov/permits/ erp/what.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). See supra note
138 and accompanying text.
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2. Self-Audits and Audit Policies
On the business side of the equation, it is increasingly common
to develop active internal procedures for monitoring compliance, mini-
mizing the risk of violations and fixing them when they do occur. The
motivation for doing so may be pure standard-model self-interest in
avoiding penalties or other sanctions. Nevertheless, these practices are
a step toward a model in which business does more than simply take
direction and do the minimum necessary.
EPA and many state agencies encourage self-auditing through
policies or laws that reduce or eliminate penalties where a company finds
a violation on its own, reports it, and corrects it in a reasonable length
of time.'45 These policies seek both to encourage self-audits, and to allow
the agencies to redirect their efforts toward more recalcitrant companies.
3. Environmental Management Systems
A growing number of firms have gone beyond self-policing to
adopting full-blown environmental management systems ("EMS")." The
expected elements of an EMS are so well-established that an international
standard was adopted in 1996,'4 against which systems can be audited to
ensure that they contain the essential components of a "plan-do-check-
145 See, e.g., Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and Prevention
of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000). For examples of typical state laws, see
MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 324.14801-02 (1997); Colorado Department of Public Health and
Environment, Environmental Audit Privilege and Immunity Law, http'J/www.cdphe.state
.co.us/ek/crossmedialselfaudit/audithom.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (explaining the
"penalty immunity component" of the Colorado environmental audit law codified in COLO.
REv. STAT. §§ 25-1-114.5 to -114.6 (1999)); see also Environmental Protection Agency, State
Audit Privilege and Immunity Laws & Self-Disclosure Laws and Policies, http://www.epa
.gov/cgi-bin/epaprintonly.cgi (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
'" See Christopher L. Bell, Environmental Management Systems and Environmental
Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 859 (Thomas F. P. Sullivan ed., 18th ed. 2005)
[hereinafter Bell, Environmental Management Systems]; Case, The EPA's Environmental
Stewardship Initiative, supra note 1, at 69-75; Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash,
Environmental Management Systems and the New Policy Agenda, in REGULATING FROM
THE INSIDE, supra note 1, at 1, 1-4 [hereinafter Coglianese & Nash, Environmental
Management Systems].
147 This international EMS standard was published by the International Organization for
Standardization ("ISO") as ISO 14001. Christopher L. Bell, ISO 14001: Application of
International Environmental Management Systems Standards in the United States, 27 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,678, at 10,678 (1997) [hereinafter Bell, ISO 14001:Application].
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act" system. 4 ' A full explanation of EMSs is far beyond the scope of this
Article, but a good EMS involves establishing an environmental policy, iden-
tifying environmental aspects of concern, defining what needs to be done
to address these aspects (e.g., how to comply with relevant laws), creating
systems to carry out those steps, monitoring on a regular basis, and fixing
any problems that arise.'49 Correcting problems may require redesigning
the system itself, where necessary, to reduce the risk of future problems. 5o
The emergence of EMSs is one of the more remarkable develop-
ments of recent years in that it occurred almost entirely at the initiative
of business, rather than through government regulation.'5 ' This does not
mean that business has become altruistic; EMSs responded to the recog-
nition that potential liabilities associated with environmental issues"' are
extremely diverse, complex, and financially significant, calling for a more
comprehensive response than simply monitoring regulatory compliance.'
This shift from reactive to proactive mode can change the role of the
business to one of anticipating and preventing problems that have not
yet been identified,' a clear departure from the standard model. An
EMS also encourages integrated, holistic thinking about environmental
strategies.'55 Individual firms may vary in the extent to which they become
leaders, and the shift in thinking does not eliminate underlying conflicts
between their business goals and environmental concerns. However, it
can result in an internally-driven effort to find ways of addressing those
conflicts that are cheaper or more effective.
148 TOM TIBOR & IRA FELDMAN, ISO 14000: A GUIDE TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT STANDARDS (1996). See Christopher L. Bell, The ISO 14001 Environmental
Management Systems Standard: A Modest Perspective, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
10,622, at 10,630-33 (1997); Bell, ISO 14001:Application, supra note 147, at 10,680-82.
149 Bell, ISO 14001: Application, supra note 147, at 10,680-82.
150 Id. at 10,681-82.
" EPA has made clear that it does not intend to mandate the adoption of EMSs. Position
Statement on Environmental Management Systems (EMSs), 71 Fed. Reg. 5664, 5665
(Feb. 2, 2006) ("EPA will promote the voluntary adoption of EMSs... [and] will rely on
public education and voluntary programs."); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA'S STRATEGY
FOR DETERMINING THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN REGULATORY
PROGRAMS (2004) [hereinafter EPA EMS STRATEGY] ("EPA wishes to make clear that it
has no intention of mandating the use of EMSs in rules and permits.").
12 These include not only sanctions for regulatory violations, but also civil tort liability
and the less tangible effects of community or NGO opposition.
153 Bell, ISO 14001: Application, supra note 147, at 10,680.
'1 Id. at 10,680-82.
15 5 See id. at 10,680.
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4. Pollution Prevention
It has been recognized for many years that controlling pollution is
less desirable in the long run than finding ways to prevent it, either by
reusing waste materials or by changing processes, products, or behaviors
to avoid creating environmental risks in the first place." 6 Many believe
that these more fundamental strategies will ultimately achieve greater
environmental gains with less economic dislocation than "first-generation"
controls. 157
Pollution prevention is not inherently incompatible with the stan-
dard model; however, it tends to be associated with the alternative model
because it is difficult to mandate. As noted earlier, 5 ' innovations such
as redesigning products, or inventing new ways of making products, or
choosing a cleaner energy source, or finding a way to reuse formerly dis-
carded materials, are generally too complex to impose through uniform
legal requirements. Furthermore, these approaches depend heavily on
intimate knowledge of particular production processes, which is generally
beyond the capacity of government agencies. Therefore, agencies generally
promote pollution prevention through technical assistance programs. In
some cases, firms have been required to undertake pollution prevention
reviews, the content and implementation of which is left to their control.
The theory is that they are in the best position to find new solutions, and
that, at least where the solutions involve net savings to the company, it
will choose to put them into practice.'59
5. Voluntary Partnership Programs
To encourage desirable behavior without regulation, agencies have
increasingly turned to non-regulatory "partnership programs."' From
" For a brief history of the emergence of pollution prevention as a strategy, see Geiser,
supra note 61, at 430; see also Strasser, supra note 9, at 50 (describing the evolution of
pollution prevention initiatives at EPA from the first Bush administration to the Clinton
administration).
'5 See Geiser, supra note 61, at 430-31; see also Strasser, supra note 9, at 103.
' See supra Part I.B.
'
59 See Lori D. Snyder, Are Management-Based Programs Effective? Evidence from Sate
Pollution Prevention Programs (Reg. Pol'y Program, Center for Bus. & Gov't, John F.
Kennedy School of Gov't, Harv. U., Working Paper No. RPP-2003-21, 2003), available at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/research/rpp/RPP-2003-21.pdf (finding that pollution
prevention planning requirements correlate with pollution reduction).
"'
60 As used here, the term "voluntary program" refers to government-led programs that
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a few early cases such as EPA's "33/50" program,' 6' these programs have
proliferated to the point where EPA alone has over one hundred.'62 The
goals of these programs and the strategies they use to try to encourage
better behavior vary tremendously; some offer recognition, others share
information, still others rely on product labeling (e.g., designating energy-
efficient electronics or buildings).163
From a standard-model perspective, voluntary programs would
seem doomed to failure. In the standard model, regulated firms know their
processes, know the legal and other risks they face, and know what their
business goals are; the role of the government is to ensure that they stay
within bounds.'64 If this is true, there is little point in encouraging firms
to do more than the law requires. Skeptics argue that firms likely partici-
pate in such programs simply to get recognition for actions they would
take anyway, or worse yet, to be "free riders" getting credit while in fact
doing little or nothing. 16 5 Some critics are even harsher, viewing such pro-
grams not merely as ineffective, but as cynically-motivated substitutes
for more effective regulatory approaches.166
involve no legally enforceable commitments. This definition excludes industry initiatives
and government programs which involve formal agreements, both of which are some-
times included in this term. See Kathryn Harrison, Challenges in Evaluating Voluntary
Environmental Programs, in NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 263 (Thomas
Dietz & Paul C. Stern eds., 2002); Janice Mazurek, Government-Sponsored Voluntary
Measures for Firms: an Initial Survey, in NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
supra, at 263, 264; Farber, supra note 88, at 69. Some agencies are now beginning to
prefer the term "partnership" to convey a greater expectation of long-term commitment
both by participants and by government.
161 This program invited major companies to publicly commit to major pollution reductions
beyond those required by law. See Farber, Triangulating the Future, supra note 88, at 68-69.
162 See INNOVATION ACTION COUNCIL, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVERYDAY CHOICES:
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENvIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP 9(2005) [hereinafler EVERYDAY CHOICES],
available at httpJ/www.epa .gov/innovation/pdf/rpt2admin.pdf (identifying 133 EPA
partnership programs).
163 See id. at 6-9 (assessing EPA stewardship programs).
16 See supra Part I.A.
.
65 See Harrison, supra note 160, at 264-65; Introduction to Part III: Voluntary Measures
in the Private Sector of NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 160, at
215, 216 (noting the potential for free-riders).
"
6 See Common Dreams News Wire, EPA Drops Voluntary Program for Lead Poisoning
Prevention (June 2,2005), http://www.commondreams.org/news2005/0602-25.htm (criti-
cizing voluntary programs set up as alternatives to regulation); Nat'l Res. Def. Council,
Voluntary Efforts Won't Work: Why We Need Mandatory Limits on Carbon Dioxide,
http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/fmandatory.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
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At the same time, the number of such programs continues to grow,
as do the plausible explanations for the partnership approach. One is that
such programs can offer a superior alternative to traditional regulation
for both the regulated industry (allowing business to design cheaper ways
of achieving environmental goals) 67 and the regulator (avoiding the high
costs and long delays that any major new regulation involves). If there
is a credible threat of regulation, and the results of the voluntary pro-
gram can be assessed, a voluntary approach could provide the best out-
come. 6' It is also possible for agencies to have superior information in
some cases, which will change business or consumer behavior; this is the
logic of product-labeling programs."' Just as compliance assistance pro-
grams target businesses that would like to stay out of trouble but do not
know what the law requires, voluntary programs can help firms that want
to pursue cost-saving pollution prevention strategies but lack the technical
sophistication to do so. Therefore, a more complex alternative-model way
of looking at voluntary programs suggests that they can be valuable. The
fact that environmental groups have themselves begun using partnerships
suggests that there may be merit to the view that negotiated alternatives
can be mutually superior to a purely adversarial approach. 7 °
6. Collaboration
Less a specific strategy than an overarching way of doing business,
an emphasis on collaboration has been a recurring theme in the past decade
17 See Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation, supra note 3, at 112-13.
" See, e.g., EPA Starts Talks with Airline Industry over Voluntary Effluent Plan, INSIDE
EPA, May 19, 2006, at 9, 9-10 (discussing EPA negotiations with industry on voluntary
measures to limit effluent from aircraft deicing fluids, while deferring regulation).
Another possible example involves the use of mercury in the health care industry. Since
the health risks of mercury have attracted a great deal of attention, and a rule requiring
mercury controls at power plants was recently adopted, members of that industry likely
anticipate potential regulation as well. See Clean Air Mercury Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606
(May 18, 2005). It is probably not coincidental, therefore, that industry has worked with
EPA to form a voluntary initiative to reduce mercury use in hospitals. See HOSPITALS FOR
A HEALTHY ENV'T, MERCURY WASTE VIRTUAL ELIMINATION MODEL PLAN 1, available at
http://www.h2e-online.org/pubs/mercurywaste.pdf.
169 The Energy Star Program, for example, establishes benchmarks for energy efficient
products, homes and buildings. See Energy Star, http://www.energystar.gov (last visited
Dec. 1, 2006).
"
7 o See Alan Randall, The Policy Context for Flexible, Negotiated and Voluntary Measures,
in NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 160, at 311,316; Claudia H.
Deutsch, Companies and Critics Try Collaboration, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2006, at G-1
(describing Environmental Defense's use of industry partnerships).
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regardless of the political color of the administration. The Clinton admin-
istration championed stakeholder processes such as "regulatory negoti-
ation," and negotiated alternative site-specific solutions in Project XL,'71
while the Bush administration has continued to sound similar themes.
Michael Leavitt, EPA administrator between mid-2003 and early 2005, em-
phasized collaboration as a means of resolving issues. 17 2 More recently,
the White House issued an executive order extending the principle of
"cooperative conservation" to other federal agencies, including EPA,'73 while
collaboration has been listed as one of the current EPA Administrator's
"Principles to Accelerate the Pace of Environmental Protection."'74 The
same theme appears in the Western Governors' Association "enlibra"
principles7 . and even, increasingly, in the actions and the rhetoric of
environmental organizations.
76
7. Information
Information about the environmental performance of businesses is
far more readily accessible today than in the past, and some see infor-
mation itself as a potential driver for environmental improvement.' 77 The
example most often cited is the Toxics Release Inventory ("TRI"), mandated
in 1986 to make communities more aware of pollution they were being
exposed to (including pollution levels allowed under other regulations). 7 '
Although TRI imposed no obligation to reduce pollution levels, many
171 Case, The EPA's Environmental Stewardship Initiative, supra note 1, at 43-44.
172 ADMINISTRATOR'S 500-DAY PLAN, supra note 1.
17' Exec. Order No. 13,352, 69 Fed Reg. 52,989 (Aug. 26, 2004).
174 THE ADMINISTRATOR'S ACTION PLAN, supra note 1.
175 The "Enlibra Principles" were adopted by the Western Governors' Association in 1999.
See Western Governors' Association, supra note 77.
' Environmental groups increasingly tout their partnerships and collaborative ini-
tiatives as a complement to litigation and other adversarial activities. See, e.g., Deutsch,
supra note 170 (describing the Environmental Defense Fund's efforts to negotiate and
collaborate with business as an alternative to more adversarial methods).
177 See, e.g., David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational
Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379 (2005)
[hereinafter Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting]; Daniel C. Esty, Next Generation
Environmental Law: A Response to Richard Stewart, 29 CAP. U. L. Rev. 183, 193-204
(2001); Jeanne Herb, Susan Helms & Michael J. Jensen, Harnessing the "Power of
Information": Environmental Right to Know as a Driver of Sound Environmental Policy,
in NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 160, at 253, 253. See
ENVIRONMENT.GOV, supra note 9, at 170.
171 Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 177, at 381-86.
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businesses did so once their total releases were put on the public record.'79
More recently, the Global Reporting Initiative ("GRI") has encouraged major
firms to report to the public on their environmental performance in the
same way that they report on business performance.' 80 GRI reports that
nearly 1,000 organizations are currently using its guidelines.'
The idea that disclosure of information alone could change behavior
is distinctly "alternative-model" thinking. It sees corporate behavior as
driven by more than purely financial and legal considerations: sensitive
to community pressures, adverse publicity, and other relatively intangible
risks and liabilities. In this model, some organizations see it in their self-
interest to commit voluntarily to sharing information that they might
prefer to conceal, presumably because they believe that their performance
will be better than their competitors, that voluntary information-sharing
looks better than that imposed by pressure or litigation, or that the pub-
licity benefits of being a leader outweigh the disadvantages of releasing
information. The standard model assumes that market forces impose an
environmental race to the bottom; the alternative-model sees the possi-
bility, at least in some instances, of a race to the top. The use of infor-
mation as a policy tool is also an "alternative model" approach in that it
tends to stimulate continuous improvement, not merely compliance with
a mandated standard.
C. "Alternative Path" Strategies
A third category of programs is more ambitious than the first two,
combining strategies with the aim of establishing an entire "alternative
path" for participating organizations. In this model, a relatively small
number of exceptional firms qualify for a different regulatory regime
entirely- one that is less prescriptive, imposes less oversight, and relies
on an internal commitment to environmental leadership-to deliver per-
formance beyond what others achieve.
1. Regulatory Flexibility for Superior Performance
Some programs have offered to tailor entirely new requirements
on a case-by-case basis for organizations that agree to environmentally
.
79 Id. at 385-86.
18o Id. at 397-401.l'l Global Reporting Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
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superior alternative strategies. Although cost savings or other business
advantages are not typically required, they are assumed as the program
is voluntary in nature. The most ambitious such program was EPA's
Project XL, a Clinton administration initiative; l"2 some states followed
suit with similar programs." 3 Project XL no longer exists,' but some of
the state programs do.'
Project XL did not target any particular alternative strategy;
rather, it opened the door for regulated organizations to propose their own
strategies. 8 As a result, the projects carried out under Project XL were
extremely diverse and incorporated many of the alternative-model
strategies discussed earlier. Representative projects included:
182 Project XL has been the subject of much comment. See, e.g., ALFRED A. MARCUS,
DONALD A. GEFFEN & KEN SEXTON, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS
FROM PROJECT XL (2002); RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at 11-20; Dennis D.
Hirsch, Project XL and the Special Case: The EPA's Untold Success Story, 26 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L 219 (2001) [hereinafter Hirsch, Project XLI; Dennis D. Hirsch, Bill and Al's XL-
ent Adventure: An Analysis of the EPA's Legal Authority to Implement the Clinton
Administration's Project XL, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 129 (1998) [hereinafter Hirsch, Bill and
Al's XL-ent Adventure]; Lisa C. Lund, Project XL: Good for the Environment, Good for
Business, Good for Communities, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law. Inst.) 10,140 (2000);
Mank, supra note 134; Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation, supra note 3,
at 142; Stewart, A New Generation, supra note 35, at 64-68.
13 For examples of past leading state programs, see MINN. STAT. § 114C.01 (2005);
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, Green Permits, http://www.deq.state.or
.us/programs/greenpermits/index-htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Green Permits]
(describing Oregon's "Green Permits" program); Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources, Green Tier, http://www.dnr.wi.gov/org/caer/cea/environmental (last visited
Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Green Tier] (describing Wisconsin's "Environmental Cooperation
Pilot Program"). The Minnesota act was similar to Project XL, while the Wisconsin and
Oregon programs were more structured and required the establishment of an EMS as
a condition for receiving flexibility. Texas created "regulatory incentives" for companies
to establish EMSs. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.131 (Vernon 2005).
184 Project XL was never formally terminated, but EPA stopped soliciting new proposals
during the Bush Administration. See Environmental Protection Agency, Project XL,
http://www.epa.gov/projectXL (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). Projects initiated between 1996
and 2000 are still being implemented.
"' Oregon's highly-publicized "Green Permits" program was dramatically scaled back when
the state hit hard economic times. See Green Permits, supra note 183. After a change in
administration in New Jersey, the new commissioner canceled the prior commissioner's
"silver and gold track" program, citing its high transaction costs and relatively small par-
ticipation. The Integrator, supra note 137, at 47. Since commentators often saw the lack
of a statutory basis as a critical impediment to Project XL, it is noteworthy that the exis-
tence of legislation did not ensure survival of the state programs.
'
86 See RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at 76-78.
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* Granting a facility a "cap-and-trade" air permit al-
lowing frequent operational changes so long as emis-
sions did not exceed a predetermined limit which
was well below otherwise permissible levels; 8 '
* Waiving a prohibition on highway construction in
an area that did not attain ambient air quality
standards, to allow residential development in the
central city, thus reducing overall emissions from
highway travel by residents;'
* Deregulating certain hazardous wastes in order to
make it cheaper for them to be recycled.8 9
XL projects (and those under similar state programs) incorporated many
of the strategies described above, such as performance-based regulation,
removal of regulatory barriers, use of environmental management
systems, and public reporting of environmental performance. 19° Agree-
ments were reached through open stakeholder processes, emphasizing a
collaborative approach.'91
2. Business Leadership Programs
This second type of "alternative path" program is designed for
environmental leaders. These programs emerged somewhat later than
the "regulatory flexibility" programs, and include EPA's "National
Environmental Performance Track,"'92 and a growing number of similar
187 Id. at 75-94 (providing an overview of the Intel XL project).
188 See U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-100-F-99-026, PRojECT XL: THE ATLANTIC STEEL
REDEVELOPMENT (2002), available at http'//epa.gov/projectxl/atlantic/atlanticFactO2.pdf; EPA,
Atlantic Steel, httpJ/www.epa.gov/projectxl/atlantic/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
189 See Environmental Protection Agency, Project XL: HADCO, http://www.epa.gov/
projectx1hadco/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1 2006) [hereinafter HADCO XL Project]
(describing the HADCO XL project).
"9 See Hirsch, Project XL, supra note 182, at 219-22 (describing the strategies and ob-
jectives of Clinton-era environmental policies, specifically Project XL); Environmental
Protection Agency, Project XL: Frequently Asked Questions, http'//www.epa.gov/
projectxl/faqs.htm#3 (last visited Dec. 1 2006) [hereinafter Project XL FAQs].
191 See Project XL FAQs, supra note 190.
192 See Environmental Protection Agency, National Environmental Performance Track,
http'//www.epa.gov/performancetrack (last visited Dec. 1 2006).
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state initiatives such as Michigan's "Clean Corporate Citizen" program, 193
Wisconsin's "Green Tier" program,' and others.
In such programs the government sets up criteria for "good perfor-
mance," which typically means, at a minimum, a sustained clean compli-
ance record.'96 Most programs call for more-often adoption of a strong
environmental management system-and commitments to improvements
"beyond compliance."'97 In return, the agency provides benefits such as
public recognition, reduced enforcement priority, and reduced penalties
when violations are voluntarily reported and corrected. 9 ' Some programs
include regulatory advantages, such as greater flexibility in managing
hazardous waste, 9 9 or faster and more certain permitting times.20 0 The
most ambitious programs go even further and offer tailored, facility-
specific regulatory flexibility to those companies that make the most
extensive "beyond compliance" commitments.20 '
The more ambitious leadership programs combine many of the
alternative-model strategies discussed above. They resemble voluntary
programs in that they use recognition and other incentives to encourage
desirable behavior.20 2 They use information as an incentive by publicly
193 See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.1501-1511 (2006).
194 See Green Tier, supra note 183. This program was created by legislation entitled
"Environmental Results Program." See WIS. STAT. § 299.83 (2006).
19' For a description of various state programs, see ENVIRONMENT.GOV, supra note 9, at
47-53; Spier, supra note 1, at 206-11.
196 Even here, allowance is usually made for minor violations, an indication that even agen-
cies recognize that perfect compliance is extremely difficult to attain. See Environmental
Protection Agency, Performance Track: Benefits, http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/
benefits/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Performance Track: Benefits].
197 For requirements of the EPA's Performance Track program, see U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM GuIDE 3-8 (2005) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE
TRACK PROGRAM GUIDE], available at http://www.epa .gov/performancetrack/downloads/
PTprog-guide.pdf.
199 See Performance Track: Benefits, supra note 196.
199 See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Performance Track: Waste Incentives,
http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/benefits/regadmin/waste.htm (last visited Dec. 1,
2006) (describing regulatory benefits for RCRA compliance).
200 See, e.g., Green Permits, supra note 183.
201 One of the few programs that offers the possibility of tailored regulation is Wisconsin's
"Green Tier" program. See Green Tier, supra note 183.
202 See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Performance Track: Recognition, http:l
www.epa.gov/performancetrack/benefits/recognition.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) [here-
inafter Performance Track: Recognition] (discussing benefits from EPA recognition of
"Performance Track" participation).
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reporting the performance of their members. 2"8 They recognize the exis-
tence of and design their strategies around the potential for environmen-
tal leadership in the business community, including, but hardly limited
to, the use of environmental management systems.2' The non-regulatory
commitments they ask for from their members often include the kinds
of strategies that are difficult to mandate, such as redesigning manufac-
turing processes and products to reduce use of toxic materials, consider-
ing impacts over the full life-cycle of the product (including its disposal),
"supply-chain" management, and mentoring smaller businesses.2 5 And,
at least to a limited degree, they offer alternative and less prescriptive
regulation. They differ from the "regulatory flexibility" programs such
as Project XL, however, in that arrangements are generally not tailored
for specific participants. Therefore, although the regulatory benefits may
be less, so are the transaction costs of participation.2 6
It is possible for leadership programs to offer a combination of stan-
dardized benefits with the opportunity to negotiate more tailored, facility-
specific regulatory flexibility to those companies that make the most ex-
tensive "beyond compliance" commitments. This approach may help reduce
the controversy associated with regulatory flexibility programs by limiting
their scope to those that are already good performers. The combined model
may also come closer to the original concept of the "alternative path." How-
ever, to date, very few programs have taken such an ambitious approach.2 7
D. Focusing on Results
A fourth innovation has to do with the internal management of
environmental agencies. These changes have been less visible than most
of the strategies discussed above, but may have more significant long-
term consequences.
201 See id.
204 See PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM GUIDE, supra note 197, at 3-5.
201 See id.
206 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TRACK:
FREQUENTLYASKED QUESTIONS (2006), http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/downloads/
FrequentlyAskedQuestions3_06.pdf (noting that costs vary based on the amount of par-
ticipation by member organizations).
207 The only currently active leadership program that offers tailored flexibility appears
to be Wisconsin's "Green Tier" program. See Green Tier, supra note 183. Oregon's "Green
Permits" program also offers tailored flexibility, but has been scaled back. See Green
Permits, supra note 183.
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As noted earlier, a defining feature of alternative-model environ-
mental protection is a focus on the results being achieved rather than
the means by which they are achieved.°8 Historically, the job of environ-
mental agencies was defined in terms of carrying out the legal mandates
adopted by Congress and state legislatures. Agency performance was
judged primarily on the basis of program outputs, such as the number of
enforcement cases brought or permits issued.
Beginning in the 1990s, agencies started paying closer attention
to outcomes, rather than just outputs. In 1995, EPA announced a major
change in the way it would oversee state programs through the National
Environmental Performance Partnership System ("NEPPS"). 20 9 Rather
than "bean-counting" (measuring the number of actions taken, such as
inspections), NEPPS was intended to look at broader measures of state
agency performance such as improvements in environmental conditions. 1°
Within EPA, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993211
("GPRA") required greater attention to and reporting on program achieve-
ments." 2 However, the initial implementation of GPRA at EPA still focused
heavily on program outputs (whether tasks assigned to units were com-
pleted) rather than environmental outcomes. 213 Therefore, under the Bush
administration, EPA put increasing emphasis on "managing for results,"
using its strategic plan to focus on key environmental goals and to hold
programs accountable for advancing those goals.214
201 See supra Part I.A.
209 ENVIRONMENT.GOV, supra note 9, at 135-48; RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7,
at 46-52.
210 ENVIRONMENT.GOV, supra note 9, at 140.
211 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, § 4, 107 Stat.
285, 286-89 (1993)(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1115-1116 (2006)). See RESOLVING
THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at 39 (discussing the adoption of GRPA).
212 RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at 39-46.
213 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-77, MANAGING FOR RESULTS: EPA
FACES CHALLENGES IN DEVELOPING RESULTS-ORIENTED PERFORMANCE GOALS AND MEASURES
5-7 (2000) (finding that "outputs account for 74 percent of the performance goals and 81
percent of the performance measures in EPA's plan" for fiscal year 2000).
214 See ADMINISTRATOR's 500-DAY PLAN, supra note 1 (outlining the Administrator's
principles, which included "[rieward results, not programs"); INNOVATING FOR BETTER
ENVIRONMENTAL RESULTS, supra note 1, at 21. EPA's Strategic Plan accordingly links all
agency activities to five major goals: "air and global climate change, water, land, communities
and ecosystems, and compliance and environmental stewardship." Environmental Protection
Agency, Strategic Plan, httpJ/www.epa.gov/cfo/plan/plan.htm (last visited Dec. 1 2006).
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Shifting the focus from means to ends has the potential to funda-
mentally alter the culture of regulatory agencies. If the incentives are
right, staff will be encouraged to think creatively about the strategies that
will best achieve their goals, rather than simply carrying out legislated
mandates. This does not mean that they will always adopt unconven-
tional approaches; traditional strategies may be the most effective option
in many instances. However, a focus on results should, at least in theory,
invite them to think of themselves as problem-solvers rather than simply
"program implementers."215 A fundamental challenge is whether such an
approach can be reconciled with a legal and constitutional structure in
which the role of agencies is not (as the term "agency" implies) to initiate,
but to carry out the directions of Congress and top executive officials.
IV. CASE STUDIES IN THE "ALTERNATIVE MODEL"
The implications of choosing between the standard and alterna-
tive models, and the challenges that alternative approaches present, can
be illustrated using a few prominent examples from the recent past.
A. Regulatory Flexibility Programs
Probably the single most prominent program explicitly labeled as
a "second generation" strategy was EPA's Project XL,216 which invited
regulated parties to bring in proposals for alternative environmental strat-
egies and offered to "throw out the rule book" if they delivered superior
environmental performance.217
Project XL was launched without very specific goals; it was ini-
tiated not so much to stimulate superior performance, but to respond to
charges that the regulatory system forced the use of suboptimal strat-
... See INNOVATING FOR BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL REsULTs, supra note 1, at 20 (encour-
aging an "innovative spirit... [that] will require each individual to view his or her job
more broadly-as an environmental problem-solver, a partner, a facilitator, and a leader,
not solely as a program implementor").216 See supra Part III.C.1.
... The Agency publicly used the term "throw out the rule book." E.g., Carol M. Browner,
The Earth is in Your Hands, EPA J., Winter 1995, http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/
earthday/08.htm. For key notices announcing and clarifying the program, see Regulatory
Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,872 (Apr. 23, 1997); Regulatory
Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23, 1995). Project XL did not
demand that alternative strategies provide cost savings or other benefits, but since
participation was voluntary, this was assumed to be the case.
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egies.218 Not surprisingly, it was the availability of regulatory flexibility
that drew the most attention, much of which was critical.219 Neverthe-
less, Project XL also elicited proposals from firms that were genuinely
seeking to address environmental issues in a superior way. In addition
to reducing pollution below levels otherwise required by law, XL projects
involved commitments to strategies such as:
* environmental management systems;
220
* considering environmental impacts in product
design;221
* exploration of new and superior technologies;
222
* comprehensive pollution prevention assessment.223
A program such as Project XL is a good example of the alternative
model. On one hand, it establishes a goal of environmental performance
beyond the minimum required by law. On the other, it provides flexibil-
ity to negotiate the nature, rate or extent of the superior performance ob-
tained while creating incentives for continuous improvement over time.224
These arrangements mesh social and business goals more effectively than
2' See RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at 12.
219 See, e.g., Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation, supra note 3, at 131-33, 139-
40; Cindy Skrzycki, Critics See a Playground for Polluters in EPA's XL Plan, WASH. POST,
Jan. 24, 1997, at D1.220 See, e.g., Final Project Agreement: Imation Corp., Camarillo, CA Plant, 64 Fed. Reg.
37,785, at 37,803 (July 13, 1999); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL PROJECTAGREEMENT
FOR THE XL PROJECT AT IMATION CORP. 22-24 (1999), http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/
imation/122099.pdf.
221 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL PROJECT AGREEMENT FOR THE INTEL
CORPORATION OCOTILLO SITE PROJECT XL 6 (1996), http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/intel/
119996.htm.; Mohin, supra note 95, at 10,351.
222 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WEYERHAEUSER XL PROJECT FINAL PROJECT
AGREEMENT (1997), http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/weyer/011797.htm (follow "Part VI:
Implementing Weyerhaeuser's MIM Vison for Flint River Operations" hyperlink) (estab-
lishing a commitment to study the feasibility of further effluent reductions).
223 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL PROJECT AGREEMENT, OSI SPECIALTIES (1997),
http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/crompton/101797.htm.
224 As an example, an incentive was created by the cap-and-trade permit adopted in the
Merck XL Final Project Agreement. See Environmental Protection Agency, Project XL:
Merck & Co., Inc., Final Project Agreement, http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/merck/011697
.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Merck XL Final Project Agreement]. The
more Merck could reduce emissions below the cap, the more room it would have for
future production increases or facility changes without undergoing a permit review. Id.
See also New York v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 413 F.3d 3, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(discussing the "headroom" incentive).
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the traditional regulatory system, while creating the likelihood that, over
time, outcomes will be superior both economically and environmentally.
25
While the program was not explicitly limited to environmental leaders, EPA
was able to select the partners with which it felt most comfortable.226
The regulatory innovations seen in Project XL were also typical
of the alternative model. A common type of proposal was to establish "cap
and trade" air permits, which would allow facilities to make operational
changes without undergoing any agency review, as long as they stayed
within their emission limits. 227 This amounted to a form of "performance-
based regulation," as contrasted with standard rules which required re-
permitting any time a new source was constructed or underwent a major
modification. 22' Another proposal seen in several projects was to deregu-
late hazardous waste from electroplating operations, either to encourage
recycling or to exempt waste that was in fact not hazardous, and thus in-
directly reward those who developed less toxic production processes.229
However, the program was inherently controversial. After twenty-
five years of fighting to bring industry into compliance with more
stringent regulatory requirements, environmental advocates saw such an
approach as a retreat, not an advance.23 ° Proposals were examined
skeptically, and proponents were often held to a high standard when
225 See, e.g., Merck XL Final Project Agreement, supra note 224 (outlining the environ-
mental and economic benefits of the Merck XL Project).
226 For example, EPA screened XL applicants to exclude those with significant violations
or pending enforcement actions. See Environmental Protection Agency, Project XL:
Guidance For Compliance Screening for Project XL, http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/guide8
.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). Further, the program tended to attract organizations that
were environmentally proactive, if only because laggards had little desire to attract so
much attention from regulators and the public.
221 One example is the Intel XL Project. For a detailed study, see RESOLVING THE PARADOX,
supra note 7, at 75-94; Mohin, supra note 95, at 10,347-51. Other projects involving such
permits included the Merck XL and Imation XL Projects. See Environmental Protection
Agency, Project XL: Merck & Co., Inc., httpJ/www.epa.gov/projectxYmercklindex.htm (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006); Environmental Protection Agency, Project XL: Imation, http://www
.epa.gov/projectxl/imation/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).221 See, e.g., Mohin, supra note 95, at 10,350 (discussing the flexibility the Intel XL plan
provided).229 See, e.g., HADCO XL Project, supra note 189; Environmental Protection Agency, Project
XL: IBM Semiconductor Manufacturing Facility, httpJ/www.epa.gov/projectxl/ibm2/index
.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006); Environmental Protection Agency, Project XL: Molex
Incorporated, http://www.epa.gov/projectxl/molex/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
" See Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation, supra note 3, at 131-33, 139-40
(arguing that pollution could increase in XL projects and criticizing the suggestion that
it could substitute for command-and-control regulation). The press also tended to high-
light the risks in Project XL. See, e.g., Skrzycki, supra note 219.
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proving that results would be superior.31 Those evaluating proposals
sought a high degree of assurance that the benefits would materialize and
were not overstated. As a result, they tended to focus on the worst
outcomes that might result from a particular project, rather than the best
that might be hoped for.
The idea of offering regulatory flexibility was also controversial.
In theory, flexibility was to be an enabling device, allowing regulated orga-
nizations to identify and implement better ways of achieving environ-
mental goals. However, the program also used regulatory flexibility as an
incentive, "trading" it for superior environmental performance.232 Viewed
in this way, flexibility could be seen as a concession to obtain behavior that
environmentalists had long been urging business to adopt for other and
better reasons. Furthermore regulations rarely prohibited environmen-
tally desirable practices outright, so the need for flexibility as a precon-
dition for improved performance was not always evident.
Businesses who proposed XL projects were surprised by this
reaction. They saw themselves as offering superior alternatives to what
would have been accomplished under the traditional regulatory system.233
Further, they believed that the projects allowed them to use their superior
knowledge of their own businesses and environmental issues to create
a model that was better than the one mandated by law.234 For example,
although EPA had no authority to mandate that all coal-fired power plants
be replaced with natural gas, an individual company could offer to make
231 For example, when Merck offered to replace its coal-fired power plant with a cleaner
natural gas plant in exchange for a "cap-and-trade" permit, critics contended that other
regulatory requirements that might become applicable in the future would likely require
shutdown of the coal plant anyway, and that this inevitable replacement should not result
in increased regulatory flexibility. See JANICE MAZUREK, OECD WORKING PARTY ON NAT'L
ENVTL. POL'Y,VOLUNTARYAPPROACHES: Two UNITED STATES CASES 28-29 (2003). Similarly,
the Intel project received serious criticism from environmental groups. RESOLVING THE
PARADOX, supra note 7, at 93-94. See MARCUS, GEFFEN & SEXTON, supra note 182, at 132
(negotiation of Weyerhaeuser XL Project was "win-lose" in nature, with "continual back
and forth negotiations, especially with EPA's Office of General Counsel").
" For example, the projects involving "cap and trade" air permits typically required the
facility to agree to significantly lower emissions limits than under existing permits. See,
e.g., RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at 79-86 (describing the terms of the Intel
XL Agreement). However, the actions required to make those reductions were not pro-
hibited by existing permits. Thus, granting flexibility was not necessary to enable the
changes, but provided an attractive quid pro quo to obtain those commitments.
233 See Mohin, supra note 95, at 10,353-54 (asserting that narrowly focused demands for sup-
erior performance in each project miss the "big[ picture" benefits of policy experimentation).23 4Id. at 10,354.
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such a change as a way of addressing a pressing local haze problem.235
Critics, however, were reluctant to see such commitments as warranting
regulatory flexibility.2 31 In addition, some practices that businesses felt
showed a clear commitment to a different way of doing business, such as
EMSs or community involvement programs, did not get a great deal of
weight overall in the agency's formula for assessing superior performance."
These dramatic differences in perspective made it difficult to agree
on whether a proposal was in fact a step forward or back. It proved remark-
ably difficult to agree on the relevant "baseline" by which future results
were judged.23" EPA tended to use, as its reference point, the outcomes that
would occur if flexibility were not provided.239 It did not want to sign agree-
ments that expressly anticipated emissions levels greater than before.24°
Some businesses, however, felt that this simply penalized them for all the
efforts they had made previously to reduce emissions well below the levels
required by law.24' Absent a project, they would have the ability to increase
emissions above current levels (e.g., as a result of increased production),
while still doing more for the environment than competitors doing the
minimum required by law.242
The uncertainty inherent in some strategies also clashed with the
desire of regulators for certainty and accountability to guarantee desirable
results. Businesses wanted to set ambitious goals, but not to put them-
selves in the position of being fined for failing to achieve them. EPA, of
course, wanted assurance that the promised environmental benefits from
the project would actually accrue.' Further complicating the picture was
the fact that some kinds of commitments (e.g., agreement to undertake
3 See Merck XL Final Project Agreement, supra note 224.
236 See, e.g., Skrzycki, supra note 219.
237 See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,871, at 19,875 (Apr. 23,
1997) (listing non-"end-of-pipe" pollution prevention and similar commitments as secondary
considerations in the evaluation of superior environmental performance).
238 See RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at 14 (describing data selection and develop-
ment for the Intel XL project).
239 See id.
240 See id. at 95; MARCUS, GEFFEN & SEXTON, supra note 182, at 97.
24 1 MARcus, GEFFEN & SEXTON, supra note 182, at 87 (citing memo from 3M corporation,
whose project was not approved).
242 One proposal foundered because EPA viewed any increase in emissions over current
levels as backsliding, whereas the applicant felt that its current levels reflected substantial
reductions beyond what was required by law, and that it should retain some ability to
increase emissions as long as it stayed well below its old permit limits. See MARCUS, GEFFEN
& SEXTON, supra note 182, at 92; RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at 95.
243 MARcuS, GEFFEN & SEXTON, supra note 182, at 92.
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research into possible pollution-preventing technologies) did not lend them-
selves to easy enforcement. The resolution was to recognize three kinds
of commitments: those enforceable in traditional ways (e.g., emissions
levels); those that were central to a project, as to which nonperformance
could result in cancellation of the agreement; and "aspirational" commit-
ments that would not be enforced.' This somewhat complicated structure
demonstrates the difficulty of squeezing highly varied practices into a
regulatory structure that typically sets a single, clearly-defined standard
of practice for which compliance is universally expected.
In short, using regulatory flexibility either to remove barriers, or
to create incentives, proved complicated. The level of controversy caused
negotiations to be protracted; opportunities for community input some-
times highlighted conflicts rather than identifying shared goals.245 The
program developed a reputation for high transaction costs,246 but these
costs largely reflected more fundamental difficulties in the use of regu-
latory flexibility as an incentive for superior performance. Ultimately,
Project XL did not survive the change in administration from President
Clinton to George W. Bush, although EPA continued to implement the
projects that had been started, and to work in a more low-profile way on
new projects with states and a few companies.24 v
B. Special Treatment for EMSs
A second example of an "alternative model" strategy involves envi-
ronmental management systems. As EMSs became more widely adopted,
commentators became intrigued with their policy implications.24 At a
minimum, agencies have seen them as a potentially valuable tool for im-
proving environmental performance and have looked for ways to encour-
age their use. EPA has formally endorsed the use of EMSs and promotes
244 Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,871, at 19,875 (Apr. 23,
1997) (distinguishing between "enforceable" and "voluntary" commitments, and "corporate
aspirations").
245 See RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at 92-93 (explaining that despite extensive
stakeholder process in Intel XL project, activists were vocal critics).246 Id. at 13 (noting reasons for loss of business enthusiasm for Project XL).
" Project XL was never formally terminated, but the Agency has not been soliciting appli-
cations since January 2003. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.24 See infra note 295.
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them through a variety of voluntary programs.249 It also requires organi-
zations to adopt EMSs insome cases to resolve enforcement actions.
Some have gone further and suggested that EMSs could provide
the basis for significant changes in environmental pohcy.2 1' An EMS, it is
argued, is an indicator that a regulated organization is capable of managing
its own environmental issues with less prescriptive governmental over-
sight. Ideas that have been -suggested include offering more performance-
based requirements, redirecting enforcement efforts elsewhere, designing
administrative permit terms around the EMS, or using the EMS to identify
and take into account cross-media impacts of regulatory requirements.252
Some states have initiated programs along these lines, and EPA has in-
dicated its intent to experiment with such options.253
A number of challenges face the proponents of preferential treat-
ment for EMSs, however.254 One is that it remains uncertain whether an
249 Position Statement on Environmental Management Systems (EMSs), 71 Fed. Reg.
5664, 5665 (Feb. 2, 2006). One such program is Performance Track, which provides
benefits to environmental leaders; having an EMS is one of the criteria for eligibility.
PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM GUIDE, supra note 197, at 3. Other programs provide
encouragement or assistance for EMS implementation. See, e.g., National Biosolids
Partnership, http://www.biosolids.org (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (discussing the National
Biosolids Partnership, a joint effort in which EPA is an advisory member); Environmental
Protection Agency, Sector Programs: Environmental Management Systems, http://www.
epa.gov/sectors/ems.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006) (describing the "Sector Strategies"
program); Environmental Protection Agency, Agriculture Topics, Environmental Management
Systems, http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/tems.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (describing
EMS assistance provided by the National Agriculture Compliance Assistance Center).
250 See Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, EPA Assistant Administrator, to EPA
Regional Administrators and Regional Counsel (June 12, 2003), available at http://www
.epa.gov/compliancetresurces/policiesmcentivesems/emssetteementguidance.pdf(providing
"Guidance on the Use of Environmental Management Systems in Enforcement Settlements").251 See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Toward a Management-Based Environmental
Policy?, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE, supra note 1, at 222, 225 [hereinafter
Coglianese & Nash, Toward a Management-Based Environmental Policy?]("Many
policymakers in business and government see the movement toward EMS adoption as
an opportunity for large-scale changes in the regulatory system"); Case, The EPA's
Environmental Stewardship Initiative, supra note 1, at 73 ("Tremendous optimism exists
regarding the potential for use of EMSs as a public policy instrument rather than simply an
internal firm management tool."); Orts, supra note 27, at 1313-37 (proposing a U.S.
version of the European Union's Eco-Management and Auditing Scheme ("EMAS")).2 52 EPAEMS STRATEGY, supra note 151, at 6; Coglianese & Nash, Toward a Management-
Based Environmental Policy?, supra note 251, at 225-26.2 53 See EPA EMS STRATEGY, supra note 151, at 3.
254 See generally DAVIES ET AL., supra note 132, at 46-47 (discussing challenges facing
EMS proponents, such as corporate incentives to "minimally comply with the law," and
the fact that EMSs are not "performance-based," but "inputs" based).
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EMS-even one meeting international standards-is a guarantee of supe-
rior environmental management. Research to date indicates a high degree
of variability: some organizations use their EMSs to improve performance
significantly, but in others the system itself seems to have little effect on
either performance or compliance rates. 5 Given this uncertainty, it is
unclear that an EMS alone justifies less prescriptive legislation.
A further challenge is that a "quality" EMS is not easily defined
or assessed. If an agency is to offer special regulatory treatment for those
with EMSs, it must establish specifications to define eligibility for such
treatment. However, since EMSs are complex, and tend to be tailored to
individual organizations, this could easily lead to a set of requirements that
is more detailed and intrusive than the original regulation, and harder for
regulators to monitor and enforce.256 The existence of the international
standard for EMSs, ISO 14001, could simplify matters, since it creates an
objective standard for EMS adequacy-therefore avoiding the need for
regulatory agencies to develop their own criteria-and provides a system
of third-party assessment. Some programs have relied on the ISO 14001
standard, but others do not believe the standard is sufficient to achieve
policy goals (e.g., because it does not require community participation in
the development of the EMS),2 7 and uncertainty exists about the reli-
ability of the third party assessments.2 8
A different challenge is that EMSs are comprehensive and multi-
media in nature.259 This makes it difficult to incorporate them into new
255 DEP'T OF PUB. POL'Y, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS: Do THEY IMPROVE PERFORMANCE?, at E4-E5 (2003), available at http://www
.fedcenter.gov/programs/EMS (follow the "Lessons Learned" hyperlink; then follow the hyper-
link of the report title) (observing that sixty percent of facilities reported improvements
in environmental indicators, while less than one-third reported any decline in indicators).
256 See DAVIES ETAL., supra note 132, at 47 ("If we have learned anything about environ-
mental policy over the past decades, it is that government should focus on results and leave
the means (inputs) to the regulated entities."). Uncertainty also exists about the reliability
of the third party assessments. See Jan Mazurek, Third-PartyAuditing of Environmental
Management Systems, in ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED, supra note 7, at
455 [hereinafter Mazurek, Third-Party Auditing].
... For this reason, an EMS standard placing greater weight on "external users" such as
government, non-governmental organizations, and financial markets, has been developed
by the Multistate Working Group on Environmental Performance, a consortium of govern-
mental and non-governmental practitioners in the field. See Multistate Working Group
on Environmental Performance, External Value EMS, httpJ/www.mswg.org/featured
-projects (follow the"External Value EMS" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (describing
"External Value EMS").
"
5 See Mazurek, Third-Party Auditing, supra note 256, at 464.
259 See EPA EMS STRATEGY, supra note 151, at 6.
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rules, which are focused on narrower problems. The problem is not simply
one of scope, but of legitimacy. Suppose an agency is setting standards
for discharges to water in a particular industry, and tries to offer an option
under which companies with certified EMSs have less prescriptive require-
ments. If it makes eligibility conditional on having a certified comprehen-
sive EMS, regulated entities may fairly object that it has no authority,
in a narrow rule, to establish requirements that address all media.
Thus, while the idea of making regulatory adjustments for those
with EMSs remains tempting, it has rarely been put into practice beyond
leadership programs available to a limited subset of organizations. To do
so seems likely to require more substantial adjustments in regulatory
practice than agencies may be willing to accept.260 Analysts who have
looked closely into the matter have begun to question whether EMSs
should affect policy at all.26'
C. Cap-and-Trade Air Permits
Beginning in the mid- 1990s, EPA undertook an initiative to make
significant changes in the Clean Air Act's New Source Review ("NSR")
program, responding to complaints that it was inefficient and could even
impede environmental improvement.262 This effort culminated with the
260 For example, to avoid imposing overly prescriptive eligibility criteria, agencies may
have to rely on third-party audits and enforce compliance only in cases of serious non-
conformance. EMS conditions seem to have been used most successfully in the leadership
programs discussed supra Part III.C.2. This may be because the conditions are not reflected
in formal rules, but are a matter of program implementation, allowing significant discretion
without rendering the conditions meaningless. Moreover, such programs involve a
relatively small number of facilities and the EMS is not the sole criterion for eligibility.
2 1 Coglianese & Nash, Toward a Management-Based Environmental Policy?, supra note
251, at 228 ("although EMSs may be an effective tool.., the best policy response to their
widespread adoption may be no response at all").
262 These regulatory changes involved a series of proposed and final rules. See Equipment
Replacement Provision of the Routine Maintenance, Repair and Replacement Exclusion:
Reconsideration, 70 Fed. Reg. 33,838 (June 10, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51-52);
Equipment Replacement Provision of the Routine Maintenance, Repair and Replacement
Exclusion, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,248 (Oct. 27, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51-52);
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review
(NSR), 67 Fed. Reg. 80,185 (Dec. 31, 2002); Notice of Availability; Alternatives for New
Source Review (NSR), 63 Fed. Reg. 39,857 (July 24, 1998); Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review (NSR), 61 Fed. Reg. 38,250
(proposed July 23, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51-52). This article can offer only
a short summary of the issues presented by NSR reform. For a detailed examination of
these changes and their relation to other 'innovation' initiatives, see Hirsch, Lean and
Green?, supra note 46, at 635-37.
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Bush Administration's issuance of new NSR regulations in 2002 and
2003.263 Although the changes were intended in part to reduce the eco-
nomic burden of the regulations, EPA contended that one effect of the
changes would be to remove barriers to environmentally desirable oper-
ational practices.
These changes were attacked more intensely, and by a broader
range of critics, than almost any Agency action since the early Reagan
Administration. They were challenged both in court and in the public
forum, not only by environmental groups,264 but also by the states, who
run most of the air permitting programs today.26 Although the 2002 rules
were largely upheld,266 the fact that a change that some saw as environ-
mentally beneficial was perceived by many others as a significant step
backward highlights the challenges of using regulatory flexibility to bring
about superior performance.
To understand this controversy, it is necessary to review briefly
the essential elements of NSR. In short, the NSR program requires a
permit to be obtained before any major source of air emissions may be
constructed or significantly modified to create an increase in pollution.267
The purpose of requiring such a permit is to ensure that the facility adopts
the "best available control technology," or other more stringent technol-
ogy standards if the source is located in an area that does not attain
national air quality standards.268
NSR (as it existed prior to the rule changes) was already more
flexible than many regulations. First, rather than becoming immediately
263 Equipment Replacement Provision of the Routine Maintenance, Repair and Replacement
Exclusion, 68 Fed. Reg. 61,248 (Oct. 27, 2003); Prevention of Significant Deterioration
(PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review (NSR), 67 Fed. Reg. 80,185 (Dec. 31, 2002).
264 See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting
that environmental groups intervened in rule challenge); see also Earthjustice,
Background on New Source Review, http://www.earthjustice.org/library/background/
background on new sourcereview.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
265 See, e.g., New York v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 443 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006); New
York v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 413 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2005).266 See New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d at 10-11 (rejecting "challenges to substantial portions"
of the rule, but finding two aspects "impermissible" and a third "arbitrary and capricious").
A second NSR rule, promulgated in 2003, fared less well and was entirely overturned.
New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d. 880.
267 See Bernard F. Hawkins, Jr., The New Source Review Program: Its Prevention of
Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment Analysis Programs, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT
HANDBOOK 98, 98 (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello eds., 1998).2661 Id. at 102. For a detailed explanation of the NSR program and its differing standards
in "attainment" and 'non-attainment" areas, see id. at 98-145.
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applicable to all sources, the requirements apply only when significant
new construction or changes to the facility occur.269 This means that the
facility can control, to some extent, the timing of its environmental improve-
ments, and that they will be adopted at the point when it is most likely
to be cost-effective to do so (as opposed to retrofitting controls on an other-
wise unmodified facility). The definition of "best available control tech-
nology" was not fixed, but rather can evolve over time as technology
improves, and is broad enough to encompass process changes as well as
end-of-pipe controls.27 °
Critics of NSR contended, however, that the burden and delay of
permitting had significant adverse consequences for firms that needed
to make frequent changes in their production processes.271 Some argued
that the rules could discourage pollution prevention, which requires more
fundamental process changes than end-of-pipe controls.272 For example,
upgrading equipment may include installing more energy-efficient,
cleaner-running lines. If the cost of the permitting process and the result-
ing controls required is large, however, these changes may not be made.27 a
Facility-wide emission caps, or "plantwide applicability limits"
("PAL") in NSR jargon, reduce these administrative hurdles.274 A cap
exempts a facility from having to obtain an NSR permit when it makes a
modification as long as its emissions remain under the cap.275 In addition,
the test is applied on a plant-wide basis, rather than to individual emissions
sources within the plant, as would normally be the case.276 Such a cap
avoids the need for permitting delays (and the cost of the permitting
process) when a change is made that will not increase emissions above
the "baseline" level for the plant as a whole. 7
269 See id. at 98.
270 Clean Air Act § 169(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006) (defining best available control
technology to include "maximum degree of reduction achievable... through application of
production processes and available methods ... for control of each pollutant"). In fact, the
single greatest weakness in the NSR program is that it is too flexible, allowing facilities
to avoid installing controls if they can postpone new construction or significant modifications.
See NAT'L AcAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., A BREATH OF FRESH AIR: REvIvING THE NEW SOURCE
REVIEW PROGRAM 1 (2003) [hereinafter A BREATH OF FRESH AIR].
271 Hirsch, Lean and Green?, supra note 46, at 635-37. See A BREATH OF FRESH AIR, supra
note 270, at 1, 4 (recommending a more "performance-based" permit system).
272 Hirsch, Lean and Green?, supra note 46, at 637-38.
273 See id.
274 For a more detailed analysis of the effect of PALs, see id. at 648-52.
275 Id. at 649.
276 See id.
277 Id. at 649-50.
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The PAL approach is a form of performance-based regulation,
defining requirements in terms of a numeric goal rather than a partic-
ular desired behavior. Although traditional NSR permits do not specify
particular controls to be adopted, the fact that they require a reassess-
ment of controls whenever there is a major modification to a facility creates
an impediment to operational changes at a facility, even if they do not in-
crease emissions above the original permit limit.7 8 Rather than setting
a target and leaving other decisions up the facility so long as the target
is met, NSR requires that decisions be reviewed by a regulator whenever
there is a significant modification to the emission unit.279
A PAL clearly offers business advantages: a company can avoid
the cost of permitting, find the most cost-effective way of controlling
emissions across its facility, and change production lines quickly. How-
ever, PALs may also provide environmental benefits. As noted above,
from a pollution prevention perspective, facilitating process change is
desirable, and allowing operational flexibility could make it easier to
make changes that either intentionally or incidentally reduce emissions." °
Furthermore, the PAL approach creates an incentive to reduce emissions
in the short term. If the company can reduce its emissions, it creates room
under its cap to make changes later that increase emissions.281 Over time,
this incentive may further reduce average emissions levels. Finally, if a
firm has significantly reduced its emissions below its old permit limits,
adopting a PAL would result in tighter enforceable limits because caps
are based on historic emission levels.282
278 Although the Clean Air Act requires a permit only when a modification will result in
increased emissions, the pre-2002 rules used a conservative approach to determine if
that was the case. See 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(a)(4) (2006). As a result, it was possible to trigger
NSR even if, after the fact, emissions did not increase. See New York v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 413 F.3d 3, 16-18 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (describing"actual to potential test"). Further-
more, even if facilities can demonstrate that emissions would not increase, the analysis
itself can be expensive and time consuming. Hirsch, Lean and Green?, supra note 46, at 637.
279 Some argue that while in theory NSR permits do not specify the type of control to be
used, this does occur in practice because agencies approve permit revisions most readily
if the facility agrees to use the "reference technology" that the permit limit is based on.
Id. at 634; Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law, supra note 21, at
1268-69. See Strasser, supra note 9, at 67-71 (discussing permitting practices generally).
280 See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
281 New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d at 37.
282 See id. at 27-28. The extent of this benefit depends on how the historic baseline is set.
Critics of the 2002 rule changes objected that they allowed the facility to use any two
years in the prior ten to establish the PAL, potentially resulting in a cap higher than recent
actual emission levels. See id. The reviewing court accepted EPA's contention that this
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Therefore, a case can be made that, at least as applied to orga-
nizations that are committed to innovation and pollution prevention, the
use of PALs is likely to be good for the environment. A review by EPA of
facilities that had piloted the use of PALs and other related permitting
flexibilities found that they consistently reduced emissions over time, some-
times very significantly.2" While it is possible that such reductions might
have been made under a standard permitting regime, the consistent pat-
tern of emission reductions suggests that the absence of permitting costs
encouraged more frequent process changes. At the very least, the results
show that facilities may reduce pollution even when not compelled to by
regulation, and that modifying the NSR rules does not necessarily lead
to pollution increases in absolute terms.
So why were environmentalists so vehemently opposed to the NSR
changes?2" First, they were chiefly concerned with a different set of regu-
lated facilities than the supporters of the rule. Whereas supporters focused
on firms that needed to make frequent process changes and would likely
incorporate pollution prevention into those changes, critics looked at
those who were likely to avoid reducing emissions for as long as possible.
In the extreme case, power plants built before the NSR provisions were
enacted managed to avoid installing readily available and affordable con-
trols for decades by carefully avoiding any "modification" to their emissions
sources.2"5 These power plants represent very significant sources of pollut-
ants that are genuine health threats.28 s While some firms would use the
flexibility afforded by PALs in desirable ways, others could simply avoid
installing new pollution controls.
8 7
would occur only infrequently. Id. at 29.283 Id. at 37. For results of the full study, see U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF
IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCES WITH INNOVATIVE AIR PERMITS, http'J/www.epa.gov/
ttncaal/t5/memoranda/iap-eier.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
284 It should be noted that the facility-wide caps focused on here were not the most con-
troversial aspects of the NSR revisions. The most strenuous attacks were directed at the
adjustments in the exemption for routine maintenance (which did not have the same
environmental advantages). New York v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 443 F.3d 880 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (striking down expansion in scope of exemption). Nevertheless, critics of the
rule did not indicate any support for facility-wide caps; at best, they were attacked less
vociferously. For a defense of traditional NSR, see Driesen, supra note 123, at 187-92.
285 See A BREATH OF FRESH AIR, supra note 270, at 1-2.
286 Id at 2.
17 PALs could simultaneously facilitate pollution prevention and weaken requirements
for installation of end-of-pipe controls (which facilities would be unlikely to install absent
regulatory pressure). The net effect would depend on the circumstances of each facility.
2006]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLy REV.
Furthermore, there would be fewer opportunities for agency over-
sight and public input under the PAL approach because permitting reviews
would be less frequent. Given the low degree of trust between environ-
mental groups and industry, oversight is seen as an important aspect of
the regulatory system.
Third, critics used a different "baseline" in judging the effect of the
new rules. A proponent of the rule changes could compare the PAL to the
permit limits previously in effect (the PAL being necessarily lower because
it is based on actual historic levels). A critic, on the other hand, would
likely focus on the potential for the PAL to be higher than recent annual
emissions levels because the rule allows earlier time periods to serve as
the limit.
Thus the argument over PALs exemplifies the apparent conflict
between an approach that emphasizes regulatory control and one that
focuses more on creating flexibility for innovative ways to reduce emissions
over time. The dilemma for those revising the NSR program was that,
in order to provide the flexibility that might empower those oriented to-
ward improved performance, they risked weakening their impact on those
who would simply use the flexibility to avoid adopting stronger controls.
In other words, flexibility created the opportunity for improved perfor-
mance, but not the pressure to pursue it. Differing perspectives on how
firms would likely behave created a deep gulf between proponents and
opponents of regulatory flexibility; regulators who believed that firms
have internal incentives to reduce emissions over time supported it,
while those who deeply suspect corporate motivations were unwilling to
live with anything other than legally-mandated emissions reductions.288
V. WHERE WE ARE AND WHERE WE ARE GOING: AN ASSESSMENT
How much has the system of environmental protection actually
changed in the past decade? It has certainly evolved. The programs and
initiatives discussed in Part III document concrete and, in some cases,
lasting change in the strategies being used by environmental agencies
and other players in the environmental protection system, including both
businesses and environmental groups. These developments have taken
place at both the state and federal levels, and under both Republican and
0 This raises the interesting question of whether PALs might have been made available
only to firms with a sustained history of reducing emissions through pollution prevention.
Critics would likely have remained skeptical about the prospects for long term perfor-
mance, even in such cases.
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Democratic leadership.289 It would be hard, therefore, to pigeonhole them
as artifacts of a particular political circumstance or the pet projects of a
particular party or individual agency leader.
At the same time, when one steps back and looks at the broad regu-
latory landscape, its main features have not changed as dramatically as
might first appear. Regulatory functions remain the "core" functions of
environmental agencies, and the traditional functions of writing and
enforcing rules continue to dominate the attention of senior officials and
their counterparts in regulated organizations. "Alternative" strategies
remain just that. The preceding case studies illustrate some of the diffi-
culties in moving to an "alternative" regime.
This Part will look at the degree to which various elements of the
alternative model have been adopted, and will analyze why they have been
adopted in some cases and not in others. Finally, it will discuss predictions
about likely future developments and close by returning to the question
of appropriate corporate behavior.
A. Where We Are Today
Some regulatory changes could be considered harbingers of an
"alternative model." Performance-based permits have been adopted under
the New Source Review program,290 for example, and trading programs
are increasingly common in major new rules regulating air pollution.29 '
Guidance on effluent trading under the Clean Water Act has also been
issued,292 and an increasing number of such trading programs are now
289 See supra Part IV.
... See Hirsch, Lean and Green?, supra note 46, at 630-38.
291 Trading has been extended from the statutorily mandated scheme in Title IV of the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651m (2004). See, e.g., Standards of Performance for
New Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg.
28,606 (May 18, 2005) (establishing new mercury emissions standards); Rules to Reduce
Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule),
70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005).
292 See Issuance of Final Water Quality Trading Policy, 68 Fed. Reg. 1608 (Jan. 13, 2003); see
also Environmental Protection Agency, Water Quality Trading: 2003 Water Quality Trading
Policy, httpJ/www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/tradingpolicy.html (last visited Dec. 1,
2006) (providing EPA documents discussing the 2003 Water Quality Trading Policy);
Environmental Protection Agency, Water Quality Trading- Trading Projects and Links to
Other Information, httpv/www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/tradelinks.html (last visited Dec. 1,
2006) (providing information on trading programs in operation or under consideration).
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being adopted.293 These programs have alternative elements in that they
are not "command and control" strategies, but they are "standard model"
approaches because the government still establishes requirements with
which regulated organizations must comply. The relationship remains
arms-length and is governed by legal norms and processes. These ap-
proaches also tend to emphasize cost savings; environmental benefits
may result, but are indirect effects. Ironically, strategies that are cheaper
but not necessarily cleaner seem to be easier to implement in practice
than the win-win solutions that proponents of the alternative model usually
stress.294 In any case, significant changes have been the exception more
than the rule. The pre-existing regulatory structure as a whole remains
largely in place, and the changes that have been made have often been
highly controversial.295
Innovation has occurred within traditional enforcement programs,
although not without some controversy. As noted above, both EPA and the
states have adopted policies, rules or even legislation allowing some
enforcement relief where organizations voluntarily self-audit, report vio-
lations to the authorities, and correct them promptly.296 There was heated
debate between EPA and the states over precisely how far such policies
could extend. For example, EPA did not recognize an evidentiary privilege,
and warned states that they might lose their authority to enforce federal
requirements if they applied privileges too broadly.297 However, these
arguments were resolved, and agreed-upon policies remain in place at
both the federal and state levels. Perhaps of greater interest here,
however, are the results attained after applying these policies for a
293 See Environmental Protection Agency, Water Quality Trading: Trading Projects and
Links to Other Information, http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/tradelinks.html
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (linking to a variety of trading projects).
2' The environmental benefits of more flexible regulation should not be underestimated.
As previously noted, facilities participating in a pilot program on flexible air permits con-
sistently made significant reductions in emissions even though such reductions were not
required by the permits. See supra note 283 and accompanying text. While a cause and
effect relationship cannot be proven, this suggests that removing regulatory barriers can
have significant environmental benefits.
" For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the New Source Review rules, see supra
Part IV.C. The trading component of the mercury rule was also criticized. See, e.g., Look
to the States for Cleaner Air, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2006, at A12.
296 See Alexander Pfaff & Chris William Sanchirico, Big Field, Small Potatoes: An Empirical
Assessment of EPA's Self-Audit Policy, 23 J. POLy ANALYSIS & MGMT. 415, 416 (2004).297 See Pfaff & Sanchirico, supra note 296, at 417.
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number of years. 29" At least at the federal level, the bulk of the violations
reported were relatively minor in nature.299 Since these violations would
have been low priorities for enforcement action, it is not clear that the
policies had the desired effect of allowing EPA to make better use of its
enforcement resources.
Progress has also been made in the use of information as a tool. As
noted, the Toxics Release Inventory is well established and seems to have
had some significant impacts on emissions. EPA's website makes infor-
mation that was previously buried in agency files readily available to the
public. For example, enforcement databases can now be accessed online.
30 1
Non-governmental efforts such as the Global Reporting Initiative, 2 or
the Environmental Sustainability Index ("ESI") maintained by Yale and
Columbia Universities,3 3 are also significant. Critics contend, however,
that more could be done to fully realize the potential of information as a
tool.3" Relatively little information is available, for example, on measures
of environmental performance other than compliance or emissions figures,
or on comparative performance among facilities in the same industry.3 5
Efforts to adopt multimedia regulation have made very limited
progress. It is difficult even to pilot test such approaches within media-
based statutory and organizational frameworks, and without piloting, it is
difficult to determine whether the benefits of a system-wide overhaul would
justify the cost involved. The most notable development was New Jersey's
experiment with multimedia permitting in the 1990s.3"6 Although the state
passed legislation and the program had support from top leadership, it
earned a reputation for burden and delay.30 ' Ultimately, the program was
terminated after issuing only sixteen permits.30 8 Whether the high cost was
291 See id. at 421-28.
299 Id. at 424.
30 Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 177, at 386-87.
... See Environmental Protection Agency, Enforcement and Compliance History Online,
http://www.epa.gov/echo/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).302 See Global Reporting Initiative, httpJwww.globalreporting.org (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
303 See Environmental Performance Measurement Project, 2005 Environmental Sustain-
ability Index, http://www.yale.edu/esi (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
3o4 Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 177, at 412 (observing that
efforts to legislate further use of informational tools are at a standstill).
305 See id.; see also ENVIRONMENT.GOV, supra note 9, at 170-73 (noting the limitations of
EPA's effort to create an information program).
a0 DAVIES ET AL., supra note 132, at 75.307 Id. at 76-77.
308 Id. at 77.
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inherent in multimedia permitting, reflected the difficulty of going against
the organizational grain, or simply reflected more careful attention to these
particular permits by the reviewing staff, is an open question. °9
Similarly, sector-based initiatives have been used on a limited scale,
but not to the extent that had been anticipated. A high-profile program in
the Clinton administration produced relatively little real programmatic
change.31° A lower-profile successor program works with business sectors
to identify strategies that the industry is willing to adopt on a voluntary
basis." 1 While this program seeks to address regulatory barriers to im-
proved performance, it is hardly a fundamental reordering of the media-
based regulatory structure.312 A sector-based, multimedia strategy for
regulating small sources developed in Massachusetts has begun to spread
to other states, but its main emphasis is on improving compliance rather
than creating a system for continuous improvement.1 3 A truly ambitious
effort, along the lines of the Dutch "covenant" system,31 4 would challenge
sectors to improve performance dramatically, give them a role in deter-
mining the plan for improvement, and create enforceable commitments.
However, nothing like this has been attempted, let alone realized, in the
United States.
Programs offering tailored regulatory flexibility in exchange for
superior performance have had a particularly difficult existence. Although
the search for cleaner, cheaper, and smarter alternatives might seem
broadly appealing, it apparently did not materialize to a level that made
the new administration anxious to embrace the results. 5 Many of the
309 See ENVIRONMENT.GOV, supra note 9, at 56 (noting high transaction costs); Barry G.
Rabe, Permitting, Prevention and Integration: Lessons from the States, in ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE 14 (Donald F. Kettl ed., 2002) (describing the organizational challenges of
implementing the multimedia permit program).
31o See RESOLVING THE PARADOX, supra note 7, at 17-19; Case, The EPA's Environmental
Stewardship Initiative, supra note 1, at 41-43, 50-51.311 See Environmental Protection Agency, Sector Strategies Program, http://www.epa.gov/
sectors/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (describing EPA's "Sector Strategies Program").
312 See id. Some states are also experimenting with sector-based performance agreements. For
example, Wisconsin's "Green Tier" program has entered into an agreement with real
estate developers. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, Green Tier: Wisconsin
Builders Association Development Council Charter, http://dnr.wi.gov/org/caer/cea/environ
mental! participants/eccodev/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
313 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
314 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
315 As discussed earlier, the Clinton-era Project XL was never formally terminated, but
the Bush administration did not solicit new proposals. See supra notes 182-84 and accom-
panying text. In contrast, the Bush administration fully embraced the "brownfields"
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ambitious programs legislated by states were implemented modestly and
in some cases were terminated.316
"Leadership" programs have had greater success, at least in terms
of replication and longevity. Such programs have been adopted by a grow-
ing number of states as well as by EPA.31 They have been relatively un-
controversial, although criticism has surfaced occasionally. 18 At the same
time, the original vision of an "alternative path," in which well-managed
organizations could qualify for an entirely different regulatory regime,
remains highly elusive. Most programs provide relatively limited incen-
tives (e.g., recognition) for relatively limited achievements (e.g., good com-
pliance records and adoption of an EMS).319 Formal regulatory incentives
are few in number and generally narrow in scope.32 Although the number
of participants in such programs continues to grow, the programs still
enroll only a tiny percentage of regulated organizations.32" '
What about alternatives to regulation? At both the federal and
state level, the past ten years have seen a proliferation of non-regulatory
programs seeking to improve environmental performance and encourage
program, another innovative strategy that proved highly popular with local governments.
See, e.g., Remarks of EPA Administrator Christina Todd Whitman at the Seventh Annual
Brownfields Conference (Nov 13, 2002), http://www.epa.gov/newsroom/index (follow the
"Speeches" hyperlink; then follow "Earlier Speeches" hyperlink until finding speech
dated Nov. 13, 2002; follow the "Seventh Annual Brownfields Conference" hyperlink).
316 See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text. The exception is Wisconsin, which has
advanced from a small-scale program for providing site specific flexibility to a larger
"Green Tier" program, although not without difficulties in the legislative process. See
supra Part III.C.1.
317 See supra Part III.C.2.
318 See Press Release, Eric Schaeffer, supra note 114 (claiming that pollution increased
at ten of the thirteen original "Performance Track" facilities). Despite such occasional
criticism, Performance Track and other leadership programs have not attracted anything
like the volume of adverse comment that was directed at Project XL.319 See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
320 See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
321 Performance Track now has approximately 400 members. See Environmental
Protection Agency, National Environmental Performance Track, supra note 192. Some
state programs have also become quite large. For example, Michigan's Clean Corporate
Citizen program listed over eighty members in 2004. MICH. DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY,
MEET MICHIGAN'S CLEAN CORPORATE CITIZENS 3-4 (2004), available at http://www.deq
.state.mi.us/documents/deq-ess-p2tas-c3-c3report2004.pdf. It can be argued, of course,
that such programs affect the behavior not only of enrolled participants, but also of those
tempted to join, or more indirectly, those who are not interested in joining but do not
want to have visibly worse records than their most prominent competitors.
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an ethos of stewardship.322 These programs take so many forms that it
is potentially misleading to generalize about them. Although some have
attracted criticism, and questions about their efficacy persist, the programs
appear to be a permanent feature of the governmental landscape, as indi-
cated by EPA's recent strong endorsement of "stewardship" as an agency
goal.323 While they may be viewed skeptically by some as a weak excuse
for failure to take more aggressive action, they are often used where regu-
lation would be unlikely, such as to encourage purchases of energy-efficient
products,324 improve product design,325 or reduce driving by recognizing
the "best workplaces for commuters."326 In areas where regulation may ulti-
mately occur, such programs may have value in raising public awareness
and rewarding businesses that are early actors.327
Nevertheless, agencies continue to struggle to define their role in
promoting goals such as stewardship, pollution prevention, and sustain-
ability, as well as to define these efforts within the larger portfolio of
agency activities. 328 A few programs have found effective non-regulatory
motivators,3 29 but to date, most rely on some mix of exhortation, providing
useful information and benchmarking behavior, and removing some
incidental regulatory barriers.330 Despite their growth in numbers and
312 See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
313 Stephen L. Johnson, Preface to EVERYDAY CHOICES, supra note 182, at iii, iii ("I believe
[stewardship] is the next step in an ongoing evolution of policy goals from pollution
control to pollution prevention and sustainability.").324 See About Energy Star, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfin?c=about.ab-index (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006).325 See Environmental Protection Agency, Design for the Environment, Partnerships for
a Cleaner Future, http://www.epa.gov/dfe (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).326 See Best Workplaces for Commuters, Program Overview, http://www.bwc.gov/aboutl
overview.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (describing the "Best Workplaces for Commuters"
program). For a reflection of the sheer number of partnership incentive programs, see
Environmental Protection Agency, Partnership Programs, www.epa.gov/partners (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006).
327 In a regulatory context, early movers are not necessarily rewarded. Laggards incur man-
dated expenses later and avoid the risk of investing in a technology that is not compatible
with the rules ultimately adopted. If a rule requires reductions from pollution levels at
the time it is adopted, those who make reductions earlier are penalized again.
328 See Geiser, supra note 61, at 431-37 (discussing changing tactics and a lack of progress
in implementing pollution prevention).
329 An example of this is the increased market value of products being awarded the
"Energy Star" label. See About Energy Star, supra note 324.
330 Some programs use one of these approaches; others combine them. An example of
'exhortation" would be the "Great American Woodstove Changeout Campaign," which
uses public information campaigns to encourage replacement of older and dirtier
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size, non-regulatory programs continue to be viewed as something other
than "core" programs, and most command very small budgets.3 ' For the
most part, they operate separately from regulatory programs and do not
have the guarantee of long-term existence that accompanies statutory
mandates. Therefore, when budgets tighten, such programs are poten-
tially more vulnerable.
The most successful non-regulatory strategy is probably the
variety of efforts that can be grouped under the broad heading of
"collaboration." At all levels of government, purely unilateral agency
action is an increasingly uncommon response to major environmental
problems, as opposed to facility-specific enforcement or relatively narrow
rulemaking. Partnerships are an increasingly favored approach, whether
the subject is watershed restoration,332 controlling toxic exposures in
communities,333 or redeveloping brownfield sites.334 Many major rules
have some element of stakeholder consultation, often involving formal
advisory committees.335
woodstoves. See Environmental Protection Agency, Woodstove Changeout Campaign,
http://www.epa.gov/woodstoves/changeout.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). Programs
such as Energy Star and Best Workplaces for Commuters create quantitative
benchmarks to distinguish the best performers, relying on public awareness to reward
those companies or products. See supra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
Performance Track addresses some regulatory barriers; so have rules, such as those
removing regulatory disincentives to recycling of used computers. See Hazardous Waste
Management System: Modification of the Hazardous Waste Program; Cathode Ray
Tubes; 71 Fed. Reg. 42,928 (July 28, 2006).
331 See EVERYDAY CHOICES, supra note 162, at 7 (stating that programs devoted to
stewardship account for only 1.6 percent of EPA's budget).
332 See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, 2005 Targeted Watersheds: Summaries,
http'J/www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/initiative/2005projsumm.pdf(last visited Dec. 1, 2006)
(describing various local watershed partnerships and collaborative ventures); Potomac
Watershed Partnership, httpJ/www.potomacwatershed.net (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
133 See Environmental Protection Agency, Community Action for a Renewed Environ-
ment, http://www.epa.gov/care (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (describing community-based
toxics reduction collaborations).
331 See, e.g., South Florida Regional Planning Council, The Brownfields Partnership,
http://www.sfrpc.com/brwnflds.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (describing brownfields
partnership in southern Florida).
31 See, e.g., Revisions to Regulations Governing the New Source Review Program, 67
Fed. Reg. 80,185 (Dec. 31, 2002) (showing that changes in clean air rules reflect
recommendations of Clean Air Act Advisory Committee); Revisions to Water Quality
Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586 (July 13,2000) (showing that
changes in clean water rules were based on advisory committee recommendations).
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This does not mean that collaborative processes have always
proven superior. For example, regulatory negotiations ("reg-negs") were
at one time considered mechanisms to avoid protracted litigation, but,
while improving the satisfaction of participants, turned out to be time-
consuming and inadequate to consistently prevent litigation.336 The cost
and complexity of such multiparty negotiation proved problematic in
smaller scale efforts (such as the facility-specific XL projects), while the
earlier vision of widespread regulatory tailoring through "command and
covenant"337 has proven to be harder than expected.
It is worth noting that collaborative strategies lie on the
boundary between standard and alternative models. They are "alterna-
tive" in that agencies are not unilateral decision-makers operating
through formal legal structures and at arm's length from other actors.
If collaborations are successful, agencies may codify the decision of the
group, but often may not be the principal implementers of the agree-
ment.33 However, the negotiations often take place, to varying degrees,
in the shadow of regulation-either actual or anticipated--or of some
other potential agency action. Therefore, the regulatory framework still
serves in many cases as a reference and starting point.
In short, while there has been significant change, the operative
model in most agencies remains "standard" much more than "alterna-
tive." The most successful innovations have been those that could be
integrated into regulatory programs such as performance-based
approaches and trading,339 or requirements for reporting information.34 °
Collaborative strategies have increasingly become a normal way of doing
business.341 On the other hand, multimedia approaches, such as per-
mitting or sector-based programs,342 have had greater difficulty because
of their incompatibility with the existing statutory structure. While non-
regulatory strategies for improving performance "beyond compliance" are
336 DRIESEN, supra note 100, at 119-20 (observing that reg-negs have been time-
consuming); Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 92, at 614-15,625 (concluding that reg-negs
did not necessarily reduce litigation).
"' Elliott, supra note 88, at 183-85 (suggesting replacement of "command and control"
with "command and covenant").
... For example, EPA worked with a stakeholder group to develop the "all appropriate
inquiry" rule. However, the rule is chiefly implemented through private real estate
transactions. See 70 Fed. Reg. 66,070 (Nov. 1, 2005).
3 See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.340 See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
31 See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
342 See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
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increasingly common,343 they are not integrated into traditional core
programs and still have the appearance of temporary initiatives rather
than permanent organizational features. Ambitious "alternative path"
strategies such as Project XL have proven difficult to sustain,3" while
leadership programs have been hardier but offer limited flexibility and
reach only a small fraction of the relevant universe."'
Thus, within agencies, the two models co-exist but are not fully
integrated; in fact, tension often exists between them.346 At the most
fundamental level, two different organizational cultures exist with very
different world views.34 v These views manifest themselves in internal
policy disputes. For example, those oriented toward enforcement fear
that leadership programs could provide a safe haven for companies that
are less reliable than they purport to be. Conversely, those in assistance-
oriented programs such as prevention tend to see regulatory or enforce-
ment programs as creating unnecessarily adversarial relationships with
the regulated community. In addition, competition inevitably surfaces
over access to resources, especially in tight budget times.348
From the business side, there is also ambivalence about active
government participation. Those who set more ambitious goals than
required by law, or build sustainability into their business plans,
obviously want to retain control of their own plans and be free to set
aspirational goals that may or may not be accomplished. Formalizing a
partnership with government, even in an entirely voluntary program,
may mean making commitments that restrict future flexibility.349 It may
also bring enhanced attention, which is not always a positive thing.
35
Many opt not to participate, even in programs that would give them
public recognition for desirable steps they are taking anyway.
See supra notes 329-35 and accompanying text.
3 See supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 192-207 and accompanying text.
34 See MALCOLM K SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFT: CONTROLLING RISKS, SOLVING
PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE 184 (2000) (describing a clash of cultures between
adherents of "preventive" and "reactive" approaches in a variety of regulatory contexts).
141 See id.
3"
34For example, enforceable emissions caps set by PALs may get lower over time because
they are determined using a plant's historic emissions data for the previous ten years.
See supra notes 287-88 and accompanying text.
50 See Press Release, Eric Schaeffer, supra note 114 (calling public attention to increases
in emissions at facilities participating in an EPA program for environmental leaders).
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Thus, the transition toward a multipolar, less rule-driven system
in which businesses take leadership, partner with government, and focus
on continuous improvement rather than compliance, is incomplete at
best. Each model has its strengths and weaknesses: the standard model
has proven effective in changing behavior, yet in an inefficient and
somewhat uneven way.35' The alternative model offers greater efficiency
and the prospect of continuous improvement, but has yet to demonstrate
clearly effective alternatives to traditional legal requirements.352
B. Predicting the Evolution of the System
Clearly, environmental agencies face some important decisions.
On one hand, it appears likely that "standard model" regulation will play
a major, if not dominant, role in environmental protection for many
years. The authority to issue and enforce legal requirements is the
feature that most notably sets government apart from other actors in the
environmental protection system, and will undoubtedly continue to
define what the public expects from government agencies. It is also
where agencies will likely continue to invest the bulk of their efforts. The
government's unique role in promulgating and enforcing regulations is
clear, while its part in advancing environmental goals through other
means is less S0.
35 3
At the same time, agencies risk losing their position of leadership
if they fail to redefine their mission from that of mere statutory
implementation to achieving ambitious goals such as sustainability. It
is difficult to imagine returning to a world in which agency programs are
limited almost exclusively to writing and enforcing rules. An increasing
number of businesses and other organizations are taking environmen-
tally beneficial steps not required or even addressed by regulations (such
"' See Elliott, supra note 88, at 172-73.
352 See Geiser, supra note 61, at 436 (arguing that, despite other advantages, pollution
prevention cannot replace regulation because it requires "strong . . . enforcement
programs as policy drivers").
311 These non-regulatory programs are also run by non-governmental actors such as trade
associations and environmental groups. See, e.g., Responsible Care: The U.S. Chemical
Industry Performance Initiative, http://www.responsiblecare-us.com/about.asp (last
visited Dec. 1, 2006) (summarizing the American Chemistry Council's "Responsible Care"
program, which is designed to help companies "go above and beyond government
requirements"); see also Deutsch, supra note 170, at G-1 (industry partnerships with
Environmental Defense).
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as committing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions),354 and agencies
cannot afford to ignore these developments or fail to participate in them.
The question for agencies, then, is how to operate in "standard" and
"alternative" modes simultaneously. 55
It may be useful here to distinguish between three general
categories of alternative model strategies. The first are those involving
reforms within the regulatory structure, such as making rules more
performance-based and using trading systems where possible. Multime-
dia strategies, although they have had limited progress to date, are not
inherently incompatible with traditional regulatory structures and could
be used with appropriate changes in the statutory structure." 6 Require-
ments for disclosure of information also fall into this group. Although
these types of reforms tend to emphasize cost savings and do not directly
address the problem of encouraging continuous improvement, a less
prescriptive and more integrated regulatory system could have both
economic and environmental benefits.357
A second group of strategies uses the existing regulatory
structure as a starting point, but allows for negotiation and collaboration
to develop superior alternatives.35 This involves a greater departure
from the purely law-driven model, but legal requirements are still a
significant driver of action. It might involve redesigning regulatory
requirements for particular firms or industries, or designing large-scale
responses to location-based environmental problems that require the
involvement of many governmental and non-governmental parties.
Experience to date suggests that the latter model is more likely to be
" See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
155e SPARROW, supra note 346, at 194-203.3561 It should be noted that one of the chief attractions of a multimedia approach has been
that it may be more compatible with broad goals such as sustainability, as well as
specific strategies such as pollution prevention. See supra notes 134-41 and
accompanying text. However, simply creating a multimedia regulatory structure would
not necessarily help advance these goals and strategies.
... As already discussed, experiments with using regulatory flexibility to stimulate
superior performance (e.g., offering tailored and more flexible regulation to superior
performers) have been conceptually appealing, but the experience to date has proved
more difficult than expected. See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text. Perhaps the
best opportunity to pursue this approach is at the state level, where agencies are closer
to local circumstances and in the best position to develop tailored agreements. The
federal role could be a mix of support and oversight, both creating the room for states to
operate such programs and ensuring that they do not become vehicles for backsliding.
358 See Elliott, supra note 88, at 182-84.
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used than the former because the transaction costs involved tend to be
prohibitive except on a large scale. This group also includes programs
that take place in the absence of regulation, but in anticipation of
possible future regulation."'
The third and most challenging category involves strategies for
encouraging behavior that is difficult to reach through regulation, such as
pollution prevention, environmental management systems, product
stewardship, and other forms of environmental stewardship.30 These
strategies are perhaps the most important in that they alone promote
continuous improvement toward sustainability. At the same time, they
seem very difficult to integrate with "core" environmental programs.
Agencies face a dilemma in this area: on one hand, the goals are too
important to ignore; on the other, it is not always clear what role
government can play that is likely to have a significant, long-term impact.
For these programs to be accepted as fully equivalent to traditional
regulatory systems, agencies will have to do a better job of articulating
how they are expected to achieve results where the government's role is
not legally mandated. They will also have to be disciplined in defining the
management expectations of such programs and ensuring that those
expectations are met, which should protect against the possibility of
ineffective and superficial efforts substituting for genuine action.
In short, the alternative model does not appear to be ready to
supersede the standard one anytime soon. More likely, alternative
strategies will gradually grow in significance while both operate in
parallel. The alternative model cannot replace the standard model
because, at least to date, it often lacks tools comparable in effect to the
enforcement of legal requirements.3"' At the same time, it will continue
to be attractive because of its potential ability to achieve more ambitious
goals with less economic burden.362 The two models therefore may work
best in tandem: standard model strategies create the pressure for
improvement, while alternative strategies can be offered up to those
willing to assume leadership.
... See supra notes 332-38 and accompanying text.
30 A related but distinct category is that of problems that can be addressed through
regulation, but for which regulatory authority has not been used, such as greenhouse
gases at the federal level.
361 See Geiser, supra note 61, at 436.
362 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
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The greatest challenge for agencies will be to articulate, both for
themselves and for the public, the logic of this two-pronged strategy.
Agencies will have to define more clearly the relationship between the
two broad functions, and in particular explain the role that non-
regulatory strategies have in a government organization. This must be
done in a way that avoids suggesting that "alternative" strategies reflect
a softening or compromising of regulatory strategies. Rather, they can
in theory be a different route to achieving the same or more ambitious
goals, thus doing it the "easy way" rather than the "hard way." This also
means taking steps to ensure that the practice conforms to the theory
and that nontraditional strategies are not used simply to avoid taking
difficult or unpopular actions.363
C. The Role of Government and the Role of Business
Returning to the central focus of this Symposium: in an evolving
system of environmental protection, what is the role of business? A
changing role for government implies a change in our expectations of
business as well. The answer given by the standard model is typical of
legal and economic perspectives: the role of business is to pursue its own
self-interest, and the role of government is to correct errors (i.e., "market
failures") by adopting and enforcing rules." 4 Interaction is arms-length
and "black-box," minimizing transaction costs.
The alternative model does not fundamentally change this view
of business motivation. Specifically, it does not call on businesses to act
863 Analyzing a very similar tension between enforcement strategies that emphasize
catching violators and those that emphasize crime prevention, Professor Sparrow argues
that while it is desirable for agencies to use both strategies-a "balanced" approach-this
still falls short of the optimal "integrated" approach. SPARROW, supra note 346, at 194-95,
202-03. An agency using a "balanced" approach will create units that utilize different
kinds of tools (e.g., enforcement, pollution prevention), which then operate indepen-
dently. Id. at 195-96. An "integrated" approach, on the other hand, begins by focusing on
priority problems, and then selects the best tools (or combination of tools) to solve them.
Id. at 201-02. Sparrow argues that the latter is superior because it allows the agency to
be more certain that it is focusing on the most important problems and can demonstrate
what is being done to address them. See id. at 203. The discussion above suggests that,
for now, a "balanced" approach may be the best solution environmental agencies can
hope for; however, the ultimate goal should remain full integration of "standard" and
"alternative" models. Id. at 202-03.
31 See Geiser, supra note 61, at 436.
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altruistically."5 Rather, it considers the possibility that business self-
interest is more complex than conventionally assumed. It is not simply
that some actions by businesses may benefit both the environment and
the corporate bottom line; this has long been recognized, even if past
assumptions about the rarity of this potential have kept it from being
fully explored. Equally important is the fact that businesses vary in their
tendency and capacity to pursue strategies of this kind.
Recognizing this fact opens up the "black box" of corporate
behavior. First, it suggests that even within the zone of "self-interest,"
businesses face choices that have significant societal consequences.
Second, it suggests that part of the government's job may be to encour-
age businesses to find such opportunities. This could take place in a
variety of ways: business and government may partner in non-regulatory
programs; agencies may publicize the best performers as well as
punishing the worst; agencies may create more flexibility within the
regulatory system to remove impediments to desirable behavior. While
government is still the primary moving force in the system of environ-
mental protection, businesses may also provide leadership, particularly
in developing better strategies for achieving environmental goals, but
also in identifying problems that might be overlooked by the existing
regulatory system. Moreover, since encouraging more socially beneficial
conceptions of business self-interest does not necessarily rely on legal
compulsion, it can be provided by non-governmental actors such as
environmental groups, trade associations, or even academic institutions.
All of this adds up to a much more complex picture than that provided
by standard approaches to defining corporate legal obligations.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that the standard model is not on its way out.
Alternative-model thinking identifies limitations in legalistic solutions
to environmental problems, but to date has not found an easy pathway
to the optimal outcome. Businesses have the technical capacity to find
better solutions than those imposed by government, but still lack the
motivation to do so in many cases. While regulation falls short of the
ideal because it does not reward continuous improvement, regulators
have yet to find a tool that creates the appropriate stimulus consistently
365 See Elliott, supra note 88, at 184 (observing that alternative systems allow companies
to save costs).
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and effectively. We can, therefore, expect both environmental policy and
corporate law to remain more "standard" than "alternative" for a long
time. At the same time, we should not reject the continuing search for
ways to improve on the outcomes that have been achieved so far.
